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Introduction
Diego de Avendaño was born in Segovia, Spain, 1594. He moved 
in a very early age to South America, that is to Lima, where he
had as preceptor the famous jurist Juan de Solórzano y Pereira 
(1575—1655) \ who was Professor of Law at the University of 
Salamanca and later became oidor at the Real Audiencia in Lima 
/ Peru. In Lima Diego de Avendaño was educated by Jesuits (in 
the Colégio San Martin), later becoming a Jesuit himself. After 
having teached in the universities of Cusco (in Andean Peru) and 
Charcas or Chuquisaca (in pre-Andean Bolivia), where he held the 
position of rector, Avendaño ended his brilliant career as Professor 
of Theology in the renowned Colégio Máximo San Pablo, in the 
capital of the viceroyalty of Peru. In Lima he was also provincial
* Pontificia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul.
1 His works are: Ioannes de Soiorzano Pereira [Juan de Solórzano y Pereira] 
(1575-1655), De indiarum iure, Tornii I (Ex typographia Francisci Martinez, Ma­
drid 1629) et Tomus II (Ex typographia Francisci Martinez, Madrid 1636). There is 
a contemporary edition of Volume I; cfr. Juan de Solórzano y Pereira, De indiarum 
iure -  Liber I: De inquisitione Indiarum, ed. C. Bacierò -  L. Bacierò -  A. M. Barre­
ro -  J. M. García Añoveros -  J. M. Soto, (Corpus Hispanorum de Pace -  Segunda 
Serie VIH), Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid 2001; Juan 
de Solórzano y Pereira, De indiarum iure -  Liber II (Cap. LIS): De acquisitione 
Indiarum, ed. C. Bacierò — L. Bacierò -  A. M. Barrero -  J. M. Garda Añoveros -  J. 
M. Soto -  J. Uscatescu, (Corpus Hispanorum de Pace -  Segunda Serie V), Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Madrid 1999; Juan de Solórzano y Pereira, 
De indiarum iure -  Liber II (Cap. 16-25): De acquisitione Indiarum, ed. C. Bacierò 
-  L. Bacierò -  A. M. Barrero -  J. M. García Añoveros -  J.'M. Soto -  J. Uscatescu, 
(Corpus Hispanorum de Pace -  Segunda Serie VII) Consejo Superior de Investiga­
ciones Científicas, Madrid 2000.
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of the Jesuits in Peru and member of the Sacred Court of Faith. 
His most important works, namely the six monumental volumes of 
the Auctarium indician, were published in Antuerpia, in the years 
1668-1686. As it is well known, the first two volumes were called 
“Thesaurus indicus” due to their real encyclopedic scope2.
In this essay, we will attempt to highlight the connections be­
tween Avendaño’s probabilism in practical philosophy and Aristot­
le’s account of practical knowledge and prudence. After (1) a brief 
note on substantial differences between Avendaño’s and Aristotle’s 
views on central political themes and (2) an overview of probabilism 
as a theory of moral conscience and practical certainty, (3) we des­
cribe Avendaño’s explicit account on probable opinion and certainty 
enough for rectitude in act and (4) Avendaño conviction that his 
probabilistic theory finds support in Aristotle’s prudential account 
of practical knowledge. In the Concluding Remarks, we point out to 
future steps in this research topic, particularly regarding the way 
in which Avendaño relates probabilism, prudential account of right 
action and the sphere of law or legal justice. Truly, Avendaño’s pro-
2 Cfr. J. I. Saranyana et alii, Teología en América Latina, Desde los orígenes 
a la Guerra de Sucesión (1493-1715), Iberoamericana ~ Vervuert, Madrid -  Frank­
furt am Main, Vol. I, 1999, p. 374, note 12; Á. Muñoz García, Diego de Avendaño. 
Filosofía, moralidad, derecho y política en el Perú colonial, Fondo Editorial Uni­
versidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima 2003, pp. 29-61 (life and works), 
63-75 (on Avendaño’s probabilism); Á, Muñoz García, “Diego de Avendaño -  Bio­
grafia y bibliografia”, in J. C. Bailón Vargas (ed. y coord.), La complicada historia 
del pensamiento filosófico peruano, siglos XVII y XVIII (Selección de textos, notas 
y estudios), Universidad Científica del Sur -  Universidad Nacional Mayor de San 
Marcos / Ediciones del Vicerrectorado Académico, Lima, Vol. 2, 2011, pp, 299-343. 
A secondary literature is mentioned by J. I, Saranyana et alii, op. cit,, pp. 376, 
378-379, notes 15, 20 e 22, which I reproduce here: D. Yubero Galindo, “El “Thes­
aurus Indicus” de Diego de Avendaño”, in M. Cuesta Domingo (ed.), Proyección y 
presencia de Segovia en América. Actas del Congreso Internacional (23-28 de abril 
de 1991), Editorial Deimos, Segovia -  Madrid 1992, pp. 399-408; A. Nieto Vélez, “El 
índice del ‘Thesaurus indicus’ de Diego de Avendaño”, Revista Histórica (Lima) 36 
(1987-1989) 51-54; F. de Arzivu, “El pensamiento jurídico del P. Diego de Avendaño 
S.I. Notas de interés para el Derecho Indiano”, V.V.A.A., IX  Congreso del Instituto 
Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano. Actas y Estudios, Editorial de la 
Universidad Complutense, Madrid 1991, pp. 137-150; P. Hernández Aparicio, “La 
doctrina de Avendaño sobre los repartimientos de indios”, in M. Cuesta Domingo 
(ed,), Proyección y presencia de Segovia en América. Actas del Congreso Internacio­
nal (23-28 de abril de 1991), Editorial Deimos, Segovia -  Madrid 1992, pp. 411-419. 
Cfr. also J. C. Bailón, “Diego de Avendaño y el probabilismo peruano del siglo XVII”, 
Revista de Filosofía (Maracaibo) 60:3 (2008) 27-43.
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babilistic thinking in practical philosophy can only be described by 
surveying long passages, taken from all volumes of his Auciarium 
indicum -  the present study focuses on selected passages that we 
consider to fully represent the Jesuit master’s moral doctrines.
1. A Non-Aristotelian Thinker?
It is impossible to get an idea of the presence of Aristotle, and 
the reception of medieval schools of thought in Latin America, wi­
thout offering an appreciation of the works of intellectuals such as 
Juan de Solórzano y Pereira and Diego de Avendaño. Especially in 
the case of Avendaño, the difficulties that we have to face in order 
to undertake such a task are not only his baroque and sophisticated 
style of writing in Latin or the fact that before the late 1990s -  i.e. 
before the studies and translations of Avendaño’s works done by the 
Venezuelan researcher Angel Muñoz García3 — there was basically 
no scholarly work available about our Spanish-Peruvian master, 
but above all due to the strong impression of internal contradic­
tions that his works seem to allow to interpreters, due to his own 
methodology in investigating theological, philosophical and juridical 
themes. After all, his methodology itself is deeply influenced by his 
“probabilism” as a key tool for reaching valid points of view in moral 
and legal matters.
The attempt of explaining “probabilism” as a system of thought 
in philosophy, theology and law theory will be done in the following
3 Cfr. also Á. Muñoz García, “Diego de Avendaño en su Thesaurus Indi cus”, 
Revista de Filosofía (Maracaíbo) 36 (2000) 113-132; Idem, “La América de Aven- 
daño: la ampliación y fin del Imperio**, Cuadernos Salmantinos de Filosofía XXX 
(2003) 29-44; Idem, “Algunas funciones de los Oidores, según Diego de Avendaño”, 
Revista de Artes y Humanidades ÚNICA 9 (2004) 62-87. Cfr. Diego de Avendaño, 
Derecho, Consejo y Virreyes de Indias. Thesaurus Indicus, Vol. 1, Tít. I-1I1 (1668), 
edición, introducción y traducción de Angel Muñoz García, Eunsa, Pamplona 2001; 
Diego de Avendaño, Oidores y Oficiales de Hacienda. Thesaurus Indicus, Vol. I, 
Tít. IV'V (1668), edición, introducción y traducción de Angel Muñoz García, Eu­
nsa, Pamplona 2003; Diego de Avendaño, Corregidores, encomenderos, cabildos y 
mercaderes. Thesaurus Indicus, Vol. I, Tít. VLIX (1668), edición, introducción y 
traducción de Angel Muñoz García, Eunsa, Pamplona 2007; Diego de Avendaño, 
Mineros de Indias y  protectores de indios. Thesaurus Indicus, Vol. I, Tít. X-XI y  
Complementos, edición, introducción y traducción de Angel Muñoz García, Eunsa, 
Pamplona 2009.
56 ROBERTO H0FME1STER PICH
pages; before proceeding, however, we need to mention a further 
difficulty regarding the purpose of finding and characterizing rele­
vant aspects of “political Arisiotelianism” in Avendaiio’s thought. His 
sources in theology and philosophy are mainly the Church Fathers 
and eclectic versions of Thomism that he inherited from several Sa- 
lamancan thinkers; his juridical views not only present a notorious 
acquaintance with the Roman-Latin tradition of canon law, but are 
also deeply influenced by Roman civil law; with these two characteris­
tics Avendaño combines a rigid form of Christian universalism4 up to 
the point of defending a theocratic basis, not a jusnaturalistic one, for 
legitimating the “origin of power” and government — hence rendering 
unfruitful any attempt to characterize any alleged “Aristotelianism” 
in his thought. His political views, thus, would stay in remarkable 
contrast to those defended by the Salamancan master Francisco de 
Vitoria O.P. (1483-1546) more than a century before, who, following 
Aquinas, proposed that the origin of power and rulership was to be 
found in nature alone, i.e. in human rational nature, a doctrine which 
he exposed in his Depotestate civili (1528) and in his De indis recenter 
inventis relectio prior (1538-1539)5.
To the point, Avendaño revisited in a very singular way Vito­
ria's views about religious infidelity as a possible reason for denying 
one's “rulership” (dominium) over things. His unique account is 
a combination of his probabilistic theory on moral certainty and 
the interpretation of law, and his political defense of a hierocratic
4 Cfr, Victor Hugo Martel Paredes, La filosofía moral -  El debate sobre el 
probabilismo en el Perú, Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos -  Lluvia Editores -  
Fondo Editorial de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima 2007, p. 52.
5 Francisco de Vitoria, “De la potestad civil (De potentate civili)’’, in Francisco 
de Vitoria, Obras de Francisco de Vitoria -  Relecciones teológicas, edición crítica del 
texto latino, versión española, introducción general e introducciones con el estudio 
de su doctrina teologica-jurídica, por el padre Teófilo Urdanoz, Biblioteca de Autores 
Cristianos, Madrid 1960, pp, 149-195; Idem, ‘D e los indios recientemente descu­
biertos (relección primera) (De indis recenter inventis relectio prior)”, in Francisco 
de Vitoria, Obras de Francisco de Vitoria -  Relecciones teológicas, edición crítica del 
texto latino, versión española, introducción general e introducciones con el estudio 
de su doctrina teológica-juridica, por el padre Teófilo Urdanoz, Madrid: Biblioteca 
de Autores Cristianos, 1960, pp. 641-726. Cfr. also Roberto Hofmeister Pich, “Do­
minium e ius: sobre a fundamentação dos direitos humanos segundo Francisco 
de Vitoria (1483-1546)”, Teocomunicação 42 (2012) 376-401; Francisco Bertelloni, 
“Hacia la superación de la tolerancia. Los derechos de los indios en las Relectiones 
de Francisco de Vitoria”, in Rubén Peretó Ribas (ed.), Tolerancia: teoría y práctica 
en la Edad Media, FIDEM, Porto 2012, pp. 29-47.
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regime. As far as the latter topic is concerned, Diego de Avendaño 
both accepted and brought forth arguments for the legitimacy of the 
donation made by Alexander VI -  in the Bulles Inter coetera and 
others -  enabling imperial appropriation of lands and “patronage” 
of missions by the Spanish Catholic kings6, constituting a form of 
“gubernatio” both in civil and ecclesiastical areas that could only be 
understood under the background of Boniphace’s VIII defense, in 
the 14th century, of the plenitude of power -  as conceived above all 
in the Bulle Unam sanctam7. Consequently, any kind of civil power 
happens to be grounded not primarily in nature, but in a form of 
divine concession, mediated by the Pope's potestas. On its turn, the 
probabilism we are talking about — further explained in the next 
Sections -  is the notion that for the formation of an individual's 
moral conscience, which is to say an individual's right practical 
decisions, as well as correct juridical sentences, there is a justifiable 
room for doubt, notwithstanding the fact that one needs to overco­
me doubt in order to find rectitude in act. That happens both if the 
opinion we adopt is provable and justifiable, though less probable 
than other opinions according to authorities, and if the opinion we 
adopt is not only provable and justifiable, but also more probable 
than other opinions according to authorities.
In an important passage found in Volume IV of his Auctarium 
indicum, where Avendaño criticizes Bartolomé de Las Casas (ca. 
1484-1666) and other thinkers who showed sympathy to Las Ca­
sas’s theses about radically peaceful missionary activity and his 
questioning of the right of conquest by the Spanish Catholic kings8, 
the Jesuit master discusses again, briefly, the thesis that, based on 
natural law and the law of peoples, dominium might be conferred
6 On the relationship between Church and State and on the role of Alexander 
VI in I5t}l-16th Century politics, cfr. Joseph Höffner, Colonização e evangelho. Ética 
da colonização espanhola no Século de Ouro, tradução de José Wisniewski Filho, 
Presença, Rio de Janeiro 21977, pp. 19-46, 197-216.
7 On Boniface VIII, his famous Bulle and the impact of his determination in 
medieval political theory, cfr. Jürgen Miethke, De potestate papae. Die päpstliche 
Amtskompetenz im Widerstreit der politischen Theorie von Thomas von Aquin bis 
Wilhelm von Ockham, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2000, pp. 45-56, 68-82.
8 Didacus de Avendaño S. J., Auctarii Indici Tomus Secundus, seu Thesauri 
Indici Tomus Quartus, Apud lacobum Meursium, Antuerpia 1675, Pars Octava, 
Sectio L, De censura quadam Scriptoris adducti circa res Indicas, et aliis obser- 
vatione dignis erga ipsas, § 616, p. 420: “[Contra Episcopum Chiapensem unde 
institui possit concertatio]. Citatus Chiapensis Praesul, cuius scripta iam pridem
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to the indigenous peoples, even though they are infidels9. Avendaho 
considers the contrary opinion, that infidelity and idolatry deprive 
people from true rulership, as at least probable, for it is defended 
by a high number of authorities in theology and law; consequently, 
in the balance of probabilities, there is a fair legal-moral claim in 
favor of the concession or conquest of those lands by the Christian 
princes -- who may wage a just war of conquest against their inha­
bitants, if necessary. Such an opinion would be even more common 
and more useful to the catholic faith. Avendaho is acquainted with 
the Council of Constance (1414-1418), where Jan Hus (1369-1415) 
and John Wyclif (ca. 1328-1384)10 had been condemned for defending
oblitterata, nescio quo spiritu sine licentiis necessariis denuo recusa, cum revera in 
illis libellus infamatorius Indicorum Conquisitorum, et multorum aliorum videatur 
contineri, ut eidem obiecit Oenesius de Sepulveda Obiectione 12 in Catholicos Reges, 
et nationem Hispanam maledicentia redundante, ut merito visum fuerit ea colligi et 
asseruari, Regia auctoritate, pro ut videri potest apud Dom Solor zanum Tomo I de 
iure Indiarum lib. 2 Cap. I num. 23 vers. Sextus, quoddam, qui praefati scriptoris, 
acerrimi quamvis, virtutes agnoscit, et cum multis, quod adducit, depraedicat eodem 
Cap. 1 num. 26 et 27 quibus ego nihil detractum velim, dum aliqua ipsius effata 
refellenda propono: sic enim in multis accidisse compertum est eximiae sanctitatis 
commendatione celebribus quorum sententiae aliquae a vero penitus deviarunt, ut 
opus fuerit illas a scriptoribus fidei sincere refelli”.
9 Didacus de Avendaño S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus Secundus, seu Thesauri 
Indici Tomus Quartus, Pars Octava, Sectio L, § 617, p, 420: “(Propositio eiusdem 
de infidelium dominio in suis regnis]. Sic ergo ille Proposit. 10. Entre los Infieles, 
que tienen Reynos apartados, que nunca oieron nuevas de Christo, ni recivieron la 
fe, ay verdaderos Señores Reyes y  Principes, y el Señorío y  dignidad y preeminencia 
Real les compete de derecho natural, y de derecho de las gentes, en quanto el tal 
Señorío se endereza al regimiento y gobernación de los Reynos confirmado por el 
derecho divino Evangélico, lo mismo a las personas singulares el Señorío de las cosas 
inferiores: y por tanto en el advenimiento de IESU Christo, de los tales Señoríos, 
honras, preeminencias Reales y lo demas, no fueron privados en universal, ni en 
particular ipso facto, nec ipso ¿ure. [Oppositum censet haereticum, pro quo et censu­
ra alia]. Sic cum statuerit, statim Proposit. 11 ita subdit: laopinion contradictoria 
de la precedente Proposición es erronea y perniciosissima, y  quien con pertinacia 
la defendiere, incurrirá formal heregia. Es asi mismo impiissima, iniquissima, y 
causativa de innumerables robos, violencias y tiranías, estragos y latrocinios, daños 
irreparables, y  pecados gravissimos, infamia, hedor y aborrecimiento del nombre de 
Christo y déla religión Christiana, y  eficacissimo impedimento de nuestra Catholica 
Fe, muerte, perdición y jactura de la mayar parte del linage humano, damnación 
certissima de infinitas almas: y  finalmente de la piedad, mansedumbre, y costumbre 
Evangélica y Christiana cruel y capital enemiga. Sic ille” .
10 On Wyclifs political thought, cfr. Jürgen Miethke, “A teoría política de Joáo 
Wyclif” , Veritas 51:3 (2006) pp, 129-144, especially pp. 140ff.
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that mortal sin precludes ruler ship in civil dimensions; one of the 
reasons displayed against those two “heretics” would apparently be 
the rejection of the doctrine that infidelity is a reason for denying 
dominium. But, again, there are several forms of dominium; it is not 
simply reducible to “absolute property’ (absoluta proprietas). Rather, 
dominium might be understood as “administration” (administra­
tio), “possession” (possessio), or mere “use” (usus fructus). We would 
do well to remember that Avendano and the several authorities he 
invokes support a hierocratic regime, and thus the explanation of 
power and rulership has to change; it is defensible that infidels have 
one of those last three forms of “dominium”, as if they were faithful 
Christians, but since only the Church has' absolute property, it is 
in fact legitimate that it takes away dominium, if relevant forms of 
“offense” (iniuria) are committed. So, we are once again in the realm 
of the insecurity caused by a denial of rights that are based on na­
tural law: that infidels are politically free and rule over things and 
lands, happens to be just a religious concession, a “tolerant” attitude 
that philosophically11 is not a matter of obligation12.
11 Cfr. Didacus de Avendano S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus Secundus, seu The­
sauri Indici Tomus Quartus, Pars Octava, Sectio L, § 620, p. 421: “Secundo obiici 
potest in Concilio Constantiensi damnatum fuisse errorem Ioannis Hus et Wicleph 
asserentium dominium rerum ipso iure amitti propter peccatum. Qui et fuit error 
Armacbani, in libro, cui titulus, Defensorium pacis, improbatus a Ioann e Maiore 
in 2, dist. 42 et Iacobo Almaino in 4 dist. 15 Quaest. 2 Coi 10. Ex quo arguit Cova- 
rrubias supra num. 2 et luculentius Dora Solorzanus citato Cap. 10 nu. 56 et seqq. 
Concilium siquidem negans per peccatum dominium rerum amitti, nullum speciale 
excipit; et cum absoluta decisio sit, infidelitatem etiam comprehendit. Ad quod in 
primi dici potest Infideles non privari ratione infidelitatis eo domino, qualecumque 
illud sit, quod ipsis etiam stante in fidelitate potest competere, quatenus sine ali­
cuius iniuria rebus, quas possident, uti pro libitu possunt, dum auctoritate Eccle­
siae ab eisdem non auferuntur. Dominii enim nomine aliquando venit non solum 
absoluta proprietas, sed administrationem, possessionem, aut usum fructum, ut 
notavit Dom Solorzanus ciiaio Cap. 11 nu. 26. Qui ibidem nu. 6 et seqq. respondet 
verum dominium in Infidelibus dari, sed ab Ecclesia posse iusta de causa ad fidelia 
regna transferri et sic Hostiensis sententiam, aliorumque defendit problematico 
ritu. Atqui Hostiensis et multi alii cum eo sentientes existimant verum dominium et 
absolutam iurisdictionis et bonorum proprietatem apud Infideles non extare, et sic 
ex eorum mente proponitur ab ipso citato Cap. 10 num. I et seqq. et ita non videtur 
exacta et accommodata responsio; licet iuxta sententiam aliam possit verosimilius 
sustineri, si dicatur apud Infideles verum extare dominium, sed auctoritate Eccle­
siae auferri ab illis posse, et fidelibus Principibus praerogari” .
13 Cfr, Didacus de Avendano S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus Secundus, seu Thes­
auri Indici Tomus Quartus, Pars Octava, Sectio L, § 622, p. 421: “Cum ergo solius
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2. Some Basic Notions on the Debate around Probabilism
These non-Aristotelian aspects of Avendano’s political doctrines 
notwithstanding, we believe that there are elements of Aristotelia- 
nism in his moral philosophy that will play, at least in the form of 
a substantial foundation and an implicit “Aristotelian discourse” , 
an important role in the Jesuist master’s political philosophy lato 
sensu and, more specifically, in his juridical thought. Thus, it is 
appropriate to offer, in what follows, a short introduction -  without 
any pretense of originality -  to the historical debates around pro­
babilism.
Basically, what is the “probabilism” we are talking about* 13? 
According to Julia A. Fleming, probabilism has as a primary area 
the catholic moral theology of the 17th century, both in its academic 
and pastoral dimensions14. Literature on moral theology answered 
to new phenomena: the discovery of the New World (where different 
patterns of behavior and human relationships could be verified), the 
expansion of protestant confessions (which at least at a “positive” 
theological level proposed several changes concerning the ideals of 
a moral and perfect life) and the increasing independence of the 
sciences of nature (which could have a singular effect on religious 
views and, of course, could induce criticism to ecclesiastical autho­
rity in matters of practical life). European catholic culture expe­
Ecclesiae auctoritate dominium ab Infidelibus auferri queat, ex sententia praedicta 
non illa sequuntur absurda, quae a Praelato dicto proclamantur: in ordine enim 
ad eorum damnificationem, ut erga ipsos non liceat, perinde se habet bonorum 
possessio, ac si verum, proprium, et maxime legitimum dominium asseratur. Sic ab 
haereticis ante sententiam condemnatoriam aut criminis declaratoriam, nequeunt 
bona auferri, quia ante illam aut dominium eorum habent, aut iustam possessio­
nem, ut ait P. Sancius supra nu. 18”.
13 Cfr. Julia A. Fleming, Defending Probabilism, The Moral Theology of Juan 
Caramuel, (Moral Tradition Series) Georgetown University Press, Washington, D. 
C. 2006, pp. 1-7. Cfr. also J. Mahoney, “Probabilismus” , in G. Müller (Hrsg.), Theolo­
gische Realenzyklopädie, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin -  New York, Band XXVII, 1997, 
pp. 465-468, as well as the magnificent article by Th. Deman, "Probabilisme”, in 
A. Vacant -  E. Mangenot— E. Amann (eds.), Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, 
Librairie Letouzey et Ane, Paris 1936, pp. (numbered columns) 417-619.
u  Julia A, Fleming, op. cit., p. 1. Cfr. also J. A, Gallagher, Time Past, Time 
Future: A Historical Study of Catholic Moral Theology, Panlist Press, New York -  
New Jersey 1990, pp. 29-47.
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rienced a profound moralization of all spheres of life15. Confession 
(and of course the sacrament of penance, of which confession is just 
the second formal element) came to play a major role in catholic 
Christianity -  and this, as the studies by J. Delumeau showed at 
a deep theoretical and historiographical basis -  was one of the 
practical results of the Council of Trent16. Confession turned into 
a “casuistry”17 of decisions for relief of conscience and formation 
of right conscience18. Diagnosing sins and solving “concrete moral 
dilemmas”, pursuing the healing of the soul, the overcoming of 
doubts, the awareness of guilt and the announcement of forgive­
ness, became the central aspects of moral theology19. If all this 
demanded, first, the pastoral concern for the “existential situation” 
of the pennant, it required second the power of distinguishing “ima­
ginary” (hence objectively “false”) from “real” (hence, objectively 
“true”) guilt20.
If it is correct to affirm that an action can be evaluated either 
according to the action as such or to the “person who performs 
it”, the emphasis in the moral debate on conscience relies on the 
second aspect, i.e. the reasonable and intentional responsibility of 
the agent. More narrowly, probabilism can be viewed as a method 
“for ensuring moral responsibility in the absence of speculative mo­
15 Cfr, Julia A. Fleming, op. cit., p. 2. Cfr. J, Delumeau, Le péché et la peur, La 
culpabilisation en Occident (XlIIe.-XVIIIe, siècles), Fayard, Paris 1983, pp. 236-272, 
369-388; J. Delumeau, Laueu et le pardon. Les difficultés de la confession XlIIe.- 
XVIIIe. siècle, Fayard, Paris 1990, especially pp. 13-49, 123-149,
16 Ibid,, pp. 15f£.; cfr. also J. Delumeau, Le catholicisme entre Luther et Voltaire, 
Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1971, pp. 256-292 (above all pp. 280-290).
17 On this subject, cfr., for example, the studies collected in: J. F. Keenan -  Th. 
A. Shannon (eds.), The Context of Casuistry, Georgetown University Press, Wash­
ington, D. C. 1995, especially pp. 55-187.
18 Cfr. also L, Testa, La questione della coscienza erronea. Indagine storica e 
ripresa critica del problema della sua autorità, Publicazione del Pontificio Semina­
rio Lombardo in Roma, Roma 2006, pp. 110-164; H, E. Braun -  E. Vaìlance (eds.), 
Contexts of Conscience in Early Modem Europe 1500-1700, Paigrave Macmillan, 
Hampshire — New York 2004. M. W. F. Stone, ‘‘Scrupulosity and Conscience: 
Probabilism in Early Modern Scholastic Ethics”, in H. E, Braun -  E, Vallance (eds.), 
Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern Europe 1500-1700, Paigrave Macmillan, 
Hampshire -  New York 2004, pp. 1-16 (notes pp. 182-188), offers a useful overview 
of probabilistic ethics in early modernity.
19 Cfr. Julia A. Fleming, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
20 Ibid., p. 4.
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ral certitude”, thus putting forth a solution to “practical doubts” 
-  which, if we remember Aquinas’ view, can exist in the deter­
minations of positive judgments, although not in the synderesis. 
In the face of the maxim that it is wrong to act “upon a doubtful 
conscience” or with justifiable and relevant “fear” (formido) that 
the intended decision might be wrong, and conscious that practical 
certainty is always of a special kind, i.e. ut in pluribus, which if 
mistakenly understood would impose standards to human life that 
usually cannot be accomplished in every relevant action, above all 
in immediate concrete acting, ethics had to find means of helping 
agents to effectively act with responsibility. In order to do so, diffe­
rent systems were proposed. “Tutiorism” “required selection of the 
“safer” course [of action], i.e., the choice that best insured that the 
agent would avoid sin” . “Equiprobabilism” was a moral system that 
allowed that, in cases of doubt, one could follow an opinion which 
favors freedom, as long as it was as equally probable as the opposite 
opinion; practically, if in face of some moral challenge the agent has 
no notion of an existing rule or law and has doubts about the pro­
mulgation of any, he or she can be led by his or her freedom21. “Pro- 
babiliorism” would allow for the agent “to take a position in favor 
of liberty” (that is, in favor of a non-certain opinion) only if it were 
objectively “more probable (i.e., supported by stronger arguments, 
stronger authorities, or both) than the judgment” which constrained 
someone “by [a given] moral obligation”22. “Probabilism”, which is 
in fact the view espoused by Diego de Avendano, as we will stress 
in the course of this essay, “offered the greatest latitude for moral 
choice. Under certain circumstances, it allowed the agent to follow a 
probable opinion, even if contrasting views were arguably stronger
21 Ibid,, pp. 4-5. Alphonsus Maria de’ Liguori (1696-1787) is usually counted 
among the most notorious “equiprobabilists” ; cfr. Alphonsus Maria del Liguori, 
Dell’uso modéralo dell’opinione probabile, 1765. Cfr. also Théodule Rey-Mermet, 
Afonso de Ligório, uma opção pelos abandonados, Editora Santuário, Aparecida 
1984; Moésio Pereira de Souza, “Norma e consciencia na determinação da verdade 
moral” , Kairós -  Revista Académica da Prainha 4:2 (2007) 297-302 (282-308).
32 Cfr. Julia A. Fleming, op. cit., p, 5, Cfr. also V, H. Martel Paredes, La 
filosofía moral -  El debate sobre el probabilismo en el Perú, Instituto Francés de 
Estudios Andinos -  Lluvia Editores -  Fondo Editorial de la Universidad Nacional 
Mayor de San Marcos, Lima 2007, pp. 41-42. Representants of “probabíliorism” 
were, for example, Daniel Concina (1687-1756), Juan Vicente Patuzzi (1700-1769), 
and Fulgencio Cuniliati (+ 1759).
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in some way”. 17t]l century debate focused on the adequation of such 
just probable opinion to yield responsible moral action23.
There is a major agreement that, in historical line, the debate 
around probabilism followed an intriguing interpretation by the Do­
minican Bartholomew of Medina (ea. 1527-1581)24, a pupil of Fran­
cisco de Vitoria and later professor of theology in Salamanca, What 
turned to be known as “central principle of probabilism” was a con­
clusion to be found in his commentary to Thomas Aquinas’s Summa 
theologiae lallae: “It seems to me that, if an opinion is probable, then 
someone has the permission to follow it, even if the opposite [opinion] 
is more probable”25. Medina identified the “conformity with probable 
opinion as the rule of thumb for ensuring “the minimal standards 
of moral rectitude”26. Medina’s “system soon became the common 
teaching of theologians, to the point that in the introduction to his 
“Regula Morum” Father [Anthony] Terill” (1623-1676) “was able to 
say that until 1638 Catholic theologians of all schools were probabi- 
lists”27. Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617), in his turn, would expand 
this approach about principles of rectitude in decision to the juridical 
realm, making use of the special hermeneutics of the doctrine of 
law28. As matter of fact, “probabilism” achieved major adhesion both
23 Cfr. Julia A. Fleming, op. cit., p. 5. Cfr. also W. Redmond, “Conscience 
as Moral Judgement. The Probabilist Blending of the Logics of Knowledge and 
Responsibility", Journal of Religious Ethics 26:2 (1.998) 392 (389-405); M. Vidal, 
Nueva moral fundamental, Editorial Desclée de Brouwer, Madrid 2000, pp. 460-469.
24 Cfr. also J. Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability 
Before Pascal, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 2001, pp. 74-76; cfr. ibid., 
pp. 64-101 (Chapter Four: “The Doubting Conscience and Moral Certainty”). Cfr. 
also F. O’Reilly, Duda y opinión. La conciencia moral en Soto y Medina, Cuadernos 
de Pensamiento Español, Pamplona 2006, pp. 65-90.
25 Cfr. Barthólomaeus a Medina, [Bartolomé de Medina] O.P., Expositio in 
Primam Secundae angelici doctoris dibi Thomae, Typis haeredum Mathiae Gastii, 
Salmanticae [1577] 1578 [Apud Petrum Dehuchinum, Venetiis 1580], q. 19 a. 6, 
p. 179: “ [,.,] sed mihi videtur, quod si est opinio probabilis, licitum est earn sequi, 
licet opposita probabilior sit: [.,.]” .
26 Cfr. Julia A. Fleming, op. cit., p. 5,
27 Cfr. the entry “Probabilism", in New Advent -  Catholic Encyclopedia, www. 
newadvent.org/cathenc/12441a.htm, last access on May 31, 2017.
28 Cfr. Francisco Suarez [Francisco Suárez] S, J., De bonitate et malitia huma- 
norum actuum, in Francisco Suárez, Opera omnia, Vives, Paris, Vol. IV, 1856, XII, 
5, 8; XII, 6, 8 ; cfr. also ibid., VI, 8, 6; XII, 1, 6; XII, 2, 5; XII, 2, 7; XII, 3, 2. Cfr. also 
O. Lottin, Morale fondamentale, Desclée, Paris -  Tournai 1954, pp, 312-316, 332- 
336. Cfr. also Robert Aleksander Maryks, Saint Cicero of the Jesuits: The Influence 
of the Liberal Arts on the Adoption o f Moral Probabilism, Ashgate Publishing -  In-
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in the academy and in the pastoral spheres by the middle of the 17th 
century. From the middle of the 17th century on and for the next hun­
dred years, it progressively lost its status as a major theory in moral 
philosophy; perhaps the main internal reason for such loss were the 
accusations of laxism or “excessive leniency” in moral life29, which 
ended in the jansenist crisis and, as a consequence, touched the other 
sides of Catholicism in the 17th-18th centuries, namely the desire for 
and the challenges to ecclesiastical and political unity. We will thus 
find formal condemnations of probabilism as early as 1665-1666, by 
Alexandre VII, and in 1679, by Innocence IX30. In fact, a little more 
than one century later, the VI Council of Lima, in 1772-1773, on the 
wake of several -  also politically motivated — European,condemna­
tions of the Jesuit Order and pressed by massive anti-Jesuit propa­
ganda. condemned probabilistic views as well31.
3. Avendano as Probabilistic Thinker
If we turn our attention to Avendano as a probabilistic thinker, 
it is correct to say first that his probabilism at the theoretical level 
does not differ much from the views shared by his European inter­
locutors — he relies heavily on central figures of the Jesuit school, 
such as Francisco Suarez32, as well as on Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz
stitutum Historicum Societatis lesu, Aldershot -  Rome 2008, pp. 123-125; Luis E. 
Bacigalupo, “The Reasonable Ways of Probabilism -  A Briefing on Its Essentials” , 
in Roberto Hofmeister Pich and Alfredo Santiago Guile ton (eds,), Scholastica colo- 
nialis: Reception and Development of Baroque Scholasticism in Latin America in 
the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries, FIDEM, Barcelona 2016, pp. 84-85 (75-85).
29 Cfr. Julia A, Fleming, op. cit., p. 6. Accused of “laxism” were authors such 
as Antoninus Diana (1585-1663), Thomas Tamburini (1591-1675) and perhaps also 
Juan de Caramuel (1606-1682).
30 Cfr. Julia A. Fleming, op. cit., p. 6-7, Cfr. também D. Concina, Historia del 
probabilismo y rigorismo, Oficina de la Viuda de Manuel Fernández, Madrid, 2. 
Vols., 1772.
31 Cfr. Victor Hugo Martel Paredes, op. cit., pp. 109-141. In that context, the 
most famous anti-probabilistic pamphlet was certainly Juan Lope de Rodó, La idea 
sucinta del probabilismo, razones que establecen el probabilismo, que contiene la 
historia abreviada de su origen, progresos y decadencia: el examen crítico que lo 
establecen, y  un resumen de los argumentos que lo impugna, Lima 1772.
32 A brief, yet insightful, exposition of the role played by Francisco Suárez in 
the history of probabilism in 17th century is offered by Robert Aleksander Maryks, 
op. cit., pp. 123-125.
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0. Cist. (1606-1682)33. His own exposition, revision^ and criticisms 
of probabilistic and anti-probabilistic literature are frequent in Ms 
large volumes; in tMs and in the following Section I will work on 
selected passages that should illustrate some of Avendaño’s central 
tenets on probabilism. Such an example appears in the Volume III 
of his Auctarium indician, having as a departing point a practical 
dubious question in ecclesiastical law, i.e. “whether [...] in the In­
dias, because of necessity, [...] a Bishop can be consecrated without 
the apostolic letters”34. There are substantial doubts on this mat­
ter35; both from texts by Church authorities and reported Church 
traditions it seems that there are no unanimous premises that al­
low reaching a conclusion unequivocally right on that matter, so 
that one can conclude only a probable judgment. Shortly after the 
exposition of that concrete ecclesiological issue, Avendaño writes
33 On the place of Diego de Avendaño in the debates around probabilism, cfr., 
for example, J. C. Ballon Vargas, “El Thesaurus indicas [1668] de Diego de Aven- 
daño y los orígenes coloniales de la filosofía en el Perú”, in J. C. Bailón Vargas (ed. 
y coord.), La complicada historia del pensamiento filosófico peruano, siglos X VIIy  
XVIII (Selección de textos, notas y estadios), Universidad Científica del Sur -  Uni­
versidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos / Ediciones del Vicerrectorado Académico, 
Lima, Vol. II, 2011, pp. 281-298; J. C, Bailón Vargas, “Entre la extirpación de la 
idolatría y la reconciliación intercultural. Lugar histórico del probabilismo en el 
pensamiento peruano”, in J. C, Bailón Vargas (ed. y coord.), La complicada historia 
del pensamiento filosófico peruano, siglos XVII y XVIII (Selección de textos, notas 
y estudios), Universidad Científica del Sur -  Universidad Nacional Mayor de San 
Marcos / Ediciones del Vicerrectorado Académico, Lima, Vol. II, 2011, pp, 377-398; 
Anónimo, “La Antorcha Luminosa -  Manuscrito anónimo de fines del siglo XVIII 
(Selección, edición y notas de J. C. Bailón Vargas y R. Katayama)”, in J. C. Bailón 
Vargas (ed. y coord.), La complicada historia del pensamiento filosófico peruano, 
siglos XVII y XVIII (Selección de textos, notas y estudios), Universidad Científica del 
Sur -  Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos l Ediciones del Vicerrectorado 
Académico, Lima, Vol. II, 2011, pp. 419-471.
34 Cfr. Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Auctarium Indicum 
seu Tomus Tertius ad indici thesauri ornatius complementum, multa ac varia 
complectens extra rem indicam sacrarum professoribus profutura, Apud lacobum 
Meursium, Antuerpiae 1675, Tomus III, Pars I, Sectio I (De consecratione Indico- 
rum Episcoporum), nn. 1-12, pp. 1-4; nn. 13-24 (Dificultas specialis: An post Breve 
Alexandri VII, talis in Indiis occurrere necessitas possit, ut Episcopus ualeaí sine 
Litteris Apostolicis consecran), pp, 4-6.
35 As far as we can tell, the decision on that matter gains importance after a 
Brief (Breve) by Pope Alexander VII (born Fabio Chigi, 1599-1667; his pontificate 
ranges over 1655 until his death). As a theologian, Alexander VII was an ene­
my of Jansenism (see above all his Letter Ad Sanctam Beati Petri Sedem , issued 
16.10.1656, discussing and condemning five “Jansenist” propositions) and sym­
pathised with the Society of Jesus.
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a quite long “Appendix on probable opinion and the obligation [...] 
according to the degree of probability”, and after that he still adds 
a detailed excursus on the very same issue36.
Second, before central aspects of Avendaño’s defense of probabi- 
lism are touched, it is important to stress that the above mentioned 
doubtful issue as well as any other on a similar level of practical 
doubt bring objective difficulties to conscience and to the very act of 
achieving moral decision under a more or less known rule -  suppor­
ted by a general rule and explicitly provided by divine, canon or civil 
law. Important questions at the concrete level of human affairs need 
the mediation of positive laws or determinations that usually help 
agents seeking a safe path to right action, after deliberation on par­
ticular goods to be found and done in the circumstances of time and 
space. Following Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s views one must overcome 
doubt in order to act with excellence (in a virtuous-prudential act) or 
in a right conscience37. In such deliberative situations, the question 
to be faced is: What is the “epistemic” quality that the practical ju­
dgment must have in order to be protected by a practical certainty 
which is enough for the rectitude of act: “Safe” , “more probable 
[than]” , “as probable as” or just “probable”?38 The same question 
will be treated by Avendaño regarding other doubtful issues that 
we could consider as much more interesting and compelling to mo­
ral and legal discussions, such as the ones our author faced in the 
context of the culturally complex 17th century Peruvian viceroyal 
society, which faced the challenge of living together in peace and 
under a common juridical horizon. Some examples of them: (a) If 
I were to play a central political role in my country, should I give 
permission to the conquest of territories on the basis of a presumed 
state of -  civil or natural — servitude of their inhabitants? (b) Should 
I decide to conduct a war merely because I had received reports of 
large scale crimes against innocent human beings and natural law?
(c) Considering the situation of a particular group within a society,
36 Cfr. Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, 
Toraus III, Pars I, Sectio I, nn. 1-186 (especially nn. 25-94 and nn. 95-186), pp. 
1-45. Cfr. also Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, 
Tomus III, Pars I, Additiones ad Appendicem Sectionis Primae, nn. 456-727, pp. 
109-200,
37 Cfr. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I q, 79 a. 13; Iallae q. 19 aa. 5-6. 
Cfr. also T. Urdánoz, “La conciencia moral en Santo Tomás y los sistemas morales”, 
La ciencia tomista 79 (1952) 529-576; F. O'Reilly, op. cit., pp. 11-30.
38 Cfr. the brief descriptions of moral systems sketched in Section 2.
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like indigenous people accustomed to nomadic or basic agricultural 
life, and considering that every human being has a duty to work and 
earn his incomes, paying taxes within a society organized by public 
institutions which are supposed to provide public utilities, should 
I defend the view that mine workers are not obliged to pay taxes, 
since this kind of work severely abbreviates their life expectation?
(d) A man has lived a dissolute life, meeting in the course of it seve­
ral women and becoming a father of several children. By adopting 
the Catholic faith, which woman and family should be recognized 
as his, providing them, as a result, the expected, debitum?
Third, we should be able to understand (A) what is a “probable 
opinion” and (B) why it is considered to be enough -  as a case of 
moral knowledge — to the “security of conscience”. Although our Je­
suit thinker relentlessly quotes an entire legion of different authors 
of his century, he intensely contrasts his views with an otherwise 
quite unknown Portuguese opponent, the jurist and moral thinker 
Mateus Homem Leitão39, and demonstrates that he was fully ac­
quainted with the well known controversy between the tutiorist 
Prospero Fagnani (1588-1678)40 and the probabilist Juan Cara- 
muel41. Regarding the first point, (A) “What is a probable opinion”,
39 The dates of birth and death of Mateus Homem Leitão, who was born in 
Braga (Portugal), are unknown. He was a Doctor in Canon Law and Professor at 
the University of Coimbra. In 1646 he was an Inquisitor in Évora, and in 1649 an 
Inquisitor in Coimbra. In 1645 he published De iure lusitano, Tomus Primus in tres 
utiles tractatus divisus, Ex officina Emmanuelis de Carvalho, Conimbricae. But 
the work Diego Avendaño refers to is another one, that is Matthaeus Homem Lei- 
tonius [Mateus Homem Leitão], De conscientia vera et singularis observatio, Apud 
Sebastianum Cramoisy et Gabrielem Cramoisy, Parisiis 1652. Mateus Homem 
Leitão wrote it as he still was Inquisitor in Coimbra. Cfr. Didacus de Avendaño 
[Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, Tomus III, Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n. 
25, pp. 6-7: “ [...]. Is est Matthaeus Homem Leitonius, Eborensis et Conimbricensis 
Apostolicus Inquisitor. Prodiit etiam'Prosperi Fagnani opus, in quo ex professo 
stabilire contendit ad securitatem conscientiae non sufficere opinionem probabi­
lem, stante obligatione amplectendi partem tutiorem. Contra quam Apologema 
citatum edidit Dom Caramuel, cuius eruditum discursum quantum ad veritatem, 
quam defendit, de tuta minus probabilis opinionis sequela, amplecti potius, vene­
rari et admirari promptum est, quam novis fundamentis additis promovere. Sed 
forte erit áliquid, quo possit veritas illa (circumscriptis censuris) quam propugnat 
aliquantulum roborari”.
40 Cfr. Prosperus Fagnani [Prospero Fagnani Boni] (1588-1678), who publi­
shed, in 1665, in Rome, the work De opinio probabili tractatus ex commentariis 
Prosperi Fagnani Super Decretalibus seorsum recusus.
41 Cfr, Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S . J Auctarium Indicum, 
Tomus III, Pars I, Sectio I, n, 25, p, 6, Ioannes Caramuelis or Juan Caramuel
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Avendaño offers both a view about the concept of ‘"probable” and the 
concept of “opinion” . The adjective “probable”, when attached to an 
opinion, means, objectively, any view that can be defended or can 
receive proof on its behalf, does not go against the Scripture, the 
Fathers of the Church and the explicit (dogmatic) determinations 
of the Church, and nonetheless contains, because of the nature of 
its object, a room for uncertainty or “fear” concerning its truth. 
So, “probable” is or can turn to be the epistemic quality of a judg­
ment, a mental act. Any judgment made by someone at any time, 
written and transmitted or otherwise, under this objective basis 
keeps, subjectively, the character of being made with fear that its 
contrary part may be true. “Opinion” for Avendaño is a kind of 
mental act -  perhaps “probable” , but not necessarily “probable” , 
perhaps “improbable”, but not necessarily improbable; but neces­
sarily not strictly certain. Avendaño’s account of opinion is both 
Aristotelian and Thomasian, After all, Aristotle once said that opi­
nion “is the non-necessary understanding of a proposition, which 
is not confirmed by any certain argument” . And on the same topic 
Aquinas stated that “[...], the intellect gives assent to something 
not because it is sufficiently moved by the object itself, but rather 
because of a given election which inclines voluntarily to one part 
more than to the other; and if, in fact, this [election] is made with 
doubt and fear of one part, it will be an opinion”* 42. Accordingly, the
Lobkowitz (1606-1682), a Cistercian monk and main représentant of the proba- 
bilism Avendaho was also a follower, expressed his theses on moral truth in the 
work Theologia moralis fundamentalis, Francfurt 1652, Roma 216o6, and later in 
Apologema pro antiquisssima et universalissima doctrina de probabilitate. Contra 
novam, singularem, improbabiletnque D. Prosperi Fagnani Opinationem, Laurentii 
Anisson, Lugduni 1663. On this last work and especially on the controversy between 
Juan Caramuel and Prospero Fagnani, cfr. J. A, Fleming, Defending Probabilism. 
The Moral Theology of Juan Caramuel, 2006.
42 In fact, it is difficult to exactly determine to which passage of Aristotle’s Ana- 
lytica posteriora Diego de Avendano is referring to here. At any rate, this meaning 
of “opinion”' clearly appears in Aristoteles, Posteriorum resolutoriorum, Libri Duo, 
in Aristotelis Stagiritae, Aristotelis Opera cum Auerrois Commentariis, Primi Vo­
luminis Pars II, Apud Iunctas,.Venetiis 1562-1574 [Minerva, Frankfurt am Main, 
unveränderter Nachdruck 1962], Textus 44, pp. 394-400. Cfr. also Sancti Thomae 
Aquinatis, Summa theologiae, Ilallae, ed. Leonina, cura et studio Sac. P. Caramello, 
in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Summa theologiae, Marietti, Torino 1962, q. 1, a. 4. Cfr. 
Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, Tomus III, 
Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n. 26, p. 7: “iuxta Aristotelem Libro I de Demonstratione cap. 26 
Textu 44, Opinio est propositionis nullo certo argumento confirmata comprehensio
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following points are defended by Avendaño, who claims to follow 
Aristotle's and Aquinas’s views -  although his account of opinion 
and probability relies heavily on Cicero’s rhetorical treatment of 
“opinio probabilis”43: (a) a probable opinion is a judgment performed 
for some reason; (b) the argumentative reasons are not conclusive, 
therefore the judgment is made with formido; (c) nonetheless, there 
are reasons for the opinion expressed, therefore every opinion is up 
to a certain point capable of being object of proof or rational support, 
even if there are more things to be said in favor of the contrary of 
it44; (d) since there is not enough evidence for taking something for
non necessaria. Ubi nomine comprehensionis conceptus mentis designatur, seu iudi- 
cium de re incerta. Quod magis dilucidum ex Divo Thoma Ilallae q. 1 a. 4 in corpore, 
ubi sic ait: Alio modo intellectus assentit alicui, non quia sufficienter moveatur ab 
obiecto proprio, sed per quamdam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem 
magis quam in aliam. Et si quidem haec sit cum dubitatione et formidine alterius 
partis, erit opinio. Si autem sit cum certitudine absque tali formidine, erit fides” ,
43 Cfr. Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium, with an English Translation by H. 
Caplan, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts -  London 2004. Cfr. 
also Robert Aleksander Maryks, Saint Cicero and the Jesuiis. The Influence ofthe 
Liberal Aris on the Adoption of Moral Probabilism, pp. 83-105.
44 Cfr. Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de.Avendaño] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, 
Tomus III, Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n. 36, p. 9: “[...]. Contra quem est, rationem probabilis 
in opinione non solum sumi formaliter ab assensu in illam tendente, secundum quod 
actus intellectus est, sed etiam obiective: nam antequam quis assensum praestet 
obiecto sibi proposito, dici illud potest probabile, quatenus vim habet inclinandi 
intellectum modo dicto. Quemadmodum res non dicitur vera solum, aut vere talis, 
ab actu tendente in illam, sed ex se habet intellectum, ad vere assentiendum incli­
nare. Quamvis Spinula Tractatu de electione agibilium pag. 65. contendat nihil ex 
se esse probabile, quia in se verum est, et tantum est natum inclinare intellectum 
ad sui veram cognitionem. Unde ad summum id, quod diximus, erit verum respectu 
opinionis verae, non tamen falsae. Sed quidem cum res obiectae sint causa assen­
sus probabilis falsi, quam vim non accipiunt ab ipso assensu, ita et probabiles dici 
possunt, dum ex aliquo accidenti impeditur genuinus ad veritatem influxus: et 
quemadmodum plurium testium assertio probabilem in iudice elicit assensum circa 
Rei crimen: ita rerum multarum concursus pro testimonio est, et ita probabilitas in 
eis obiectiva resplendet. Licet ergo assensus in alterius intellectu existens, non sit 
proprius eius, qui contrarium tenet; motiva tamen non magis alterius, quam sua 
sunt: et potest prudenter philosophari sic: Haec quidem motiva me non convincunt, 
ut assensum praestem, at qui convincunt tali viri sapientis intellectum: potest ergo 
aliquid in illis subesse, quod ego non assequor, unde et prudenter possum iuxta 
illius opinionem operari. Et videmus non seraper contrarium sentientem plus as­
sequi propter quod ad assensum moveatur; dici tamen potest ob specialem intellec­
tuum dispositionem, quaedam magis uni quam alteri adaequari: unde non solum 
aeque sapiens, sed sapientior dicere potest alterius se opinionem sequi, quia non
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true or right, the will plays a role in the assent, thus making room 
for subjective preferences; this can even affect decision making con­
cerning opinative contrary parts which are equally strong, i.e. such 
an equipollence of probability force does not necessarily hinder prac­
tical reasonable judgments, for with the help of the will, or because 
of the structure of an individual will, weights can be bestowed on a 
opinion in order to decide, relieve conscience and solve disputes45;
(e) many practical judgments, i.e. those that express how a decision 
should be or what should be done by a given agent, have exactly the­
se characteristics; (f) a “probable” opinion for a given agent means, 
in a probabilistic system, merely the one part of a given contrariety 
of practical propositions or propositions about what is good / right to
levia motiva aestimari debent, quae intellectui viri sapientis coaptantur. Sicut in 
auxiliis divinis accidit: aliquod enim quandoque minoris virtutis physicae movebit 
quempiam; cum tamen aliud maioris efficaciter non moveat alium, iuxta receptam 
doctrinam Societatis” .
45 Cfr. Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendaho] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, 
Tomus III, Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n. 44, pp, 10-11: “Sed potest argui ex receptissima 
sententia, iuxta quam ex duobus bonis aequaliter propositis potest voluntas unum 
eligere, altero relicto. Verum ex hoc nequit sufficienter urgeri, quia voluntas pro sua 
libertate potest quidem bonum quodlibet ex propositis eligere; et nequit facere ut 
intellectus ea proponens, stante propositione talis indicium mutet, et dictet unum 
illorum esse eligendum, quia specialis ratio in eo extat, iam enim sibi contradiceret, 
et sine novo motivo in obiecto novam reciperet mutationem. Quod quidem in casu 
nostro accideret. Nam cum duae sententiae omnino aequales occurrunt, intellectus 
iudicat unam non esse altera probabiliorem, quia pro opposito iudicio deest motivum 
sufficiens, unde si illud haberet, sibi contradiceret: diceret enim esse simul veram 
et falsam, quia utramque esse veram, aut utramque falsam non est unde possit 
affirmare. Ex qua certa, ut videtur, positione infert P. Arriaga indicem inter duos 
litigantes aeque probabilibus fundamentis non posse rem, pro qualis movetur, uni 
adiudicare, sed inter eos dividendam, si nullus possideat; quod quidem et alii tenent, 
quos adducit et sequitur P. Palaus Tomo I  Tractatu IDisputatione 2 Puncto 10 n. 2 
et 3, et Diana Parte I  rTractatu 13 Resolutione 3. Sed Leitonius contra resolutionem 
dictam acerrime praeliatur, concludens n. 163 iudicem in eo casu debere a iudi- 
cando se abstinere; quod si compellatur, in favorem rei dicendam sententiam, nisi 
actor favorabiliorem causam prosequatur: est autem favorabilior causa matrimonii, 
dotis, libertatis, pupilli, peregrini, viduae (circa quam, si dives sit, non ita certum, 
ut in Thesauro dixi Tomo 2 in Additionibus n. 139) et generaliter quae pia est, 
ubi religio locum habet superiorem. Pro quo haec satis sint in praesenti, si addam 
Leitonii assertionem quoad abstinendum a sententia, numquam locum habituram, 
sicut rarissime P. Arriagae quoad (di)visionem, quia modus talis non est in usu, 
licet soleant iudices in eventu simili compositionem partibus suadere, aut si iudex 
compromissarius sit, de quo et inferius” ,
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which she confers weight and adheres to, even though the contrary 
side might have objectively greater, similar or equal probability: an 
opinion is something that someone has if it becomes probable to her 
by conferring it the weight that one does confer it, to the point that 
it becomes, hence, someone’s opinion46.
As to the second point, i.e. (B) that a mere “probable opinion” as 
defined does justify a given act and is enough for causing “security 
of conscience”, this is a matter of determination of what human be­
ings can actually and reasonably do when using their minds for the 
sake of morality. It is a central view in Avendano’s system that both 
legitimate and possible moral judgments to human beings are or can 
be just probable opinions in the above mentioned sense, and con­
cerning (many) positive determinations for religious, ecclesiastical, 
civil and legal conduct these are essentially the kind of opinions that 
specialized literature and corresponding authorities produced47.
46 It is understandable -  and most likely correct (see Concluding Remarks) 
-  that some authors believe that Avendano, by explaining probable opinion in the 
practical realm in that way, is not endorsing Aquinas’s or even Aristotle’s classical 
theory, according to which for a mind to adopt an opinion is to adopt or recognize 
probability or more probability in it, so that such epistemic qualities turn to be im­
mediately absent in the other side of the contrary opposition. Cfr. also F. O’Reilly, 
op. cit, pp. 11-30; L.-M. Régis, L ’opinion selon Aristotle, Vrin, Paris 1935, p, 126.
47 Cfr. Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, 
Tomus III, Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n. 27, p, 7: “His positis contendit citatus Leitonius 
sententias Doctorum non esse vocandas opiniones, quia nomen hoc tantum signi­
ficat specialem cuiusque assensum, qui est in materia conscientiae principaliter 
attendendus: non enim quid alii sentiant, sed quid opinetur qui operaturus est, pro 
regula habetur. Abusive ergo et non proprie dicuntur opiniones. Sic Cap, 2 n, 6 et 
35. Et multo magis cum ipsi sententias suas resolutive proponuntur, formidinem 
circa aliam partem non exprimendo. In quo quidem cum quaestib de nomine sit, non 
videtur circa illam obstinatius digladidndum. Nihilominus cum non sit peculiaris 
cuiusque iuris receptas vocum significationes immutare, et penitus abrogandas 
velle, ubi praesertim sapientium receptissimus consensus vim iam inde ab antiquis 
temporibus contulit, quod in praesenti evenit, merito est usus talis retinendus, et 
novantes refellendi. Deinde arguo. Nam Doctor suam sententiam proponens, id ex­
primit, quod sibi visum est verum, sed non certum, quia motiva ad assentiendum ta­
lia non sunt, ut certitudinem ex se inducant. Atqui sic assenting ut vidimus, opinari 
est: ex quo clare infertur assensum talem exterius prolatum opinionem dici posse, 
quia opinio ex eo quod manifestetur non desinit esse talis; immo magis proprie id 
videtur habere: sicut baeresis exterius prolata maxime est proprie talis” . Cfr. also 
Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, Tomus III, 
Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n. 28, p. 7: “Verum quidem est Doetores multoties assertiones 
suas ita proponere, ut formidinem circa partes contrarias non insinuent, immo ut
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The “suspicion from the roots” (formido radicalis), as Caramuel 
had mentioned, that the contrary side of the opinion may be true is 
present or may be present at any time48. After all, following Diego 
de Avendaho, this equivalence holds true: (i) actual fear of the con-
certas sibi, ob fundamenta, quibus eorum intellectus convictos profitentur. Sed ni­
hilominus assertiones huiusmodi opiniones dici possunt, licet ex parte subiecti ita 
adhaereant, ut actualem formidinem excludant: id enim contra rationem opinionis 
non est, ut ex Doctoribus, quos citat, agnoscit praefatus scriptor, n. 4. Sicut ergo cum 
quis ita assentitur, ut propter intellectus sui dispositionem formido actualis absit, 
opinio proprie est, etsi exterius proferatur, opinionis proprietatem retinebit; ita 
etiam de aliorum sententiis sentiendum, ut scilicet proprie dici opiniones possint” . 
Mateus Homem Leitao’s striet (truly “tutiorist”) views on the connection between 
probability and truth in the so-called “probable opinion”, which should therefore 
exclude “fear” of the possible truth of the contrary pari, can be clearly read in Dida­
cus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, Tomus III, Pars I, 
Sectio I, § I, n. 29, pp. 7-8: “Addit n. 6 idem esse opinionem et veram probabilitatem, 
et quasi synonima, quomodo illis terminis utuntur Sanchez Libro I  Operis moralis 
Cap. 9 n. 2 in principio, ibi: Quandocumque opinatur, et dicitur probabilis, seu 
opinio. Sayrus in Clavi regia Libro I  Cap. 5 n. 2 ibi: Alicuius opinionis, seu cons­
cientia probabilis. Et constat ex definitione, quae ita competit probabilitati, sicut et 
opinioni; et communis usus solet frequentius exprimere opinionem per terminum 
probabiliter, verbi gratia hoc fuisse, vel esse, quo significat assensum cum formi­
dine, Unde quamvis de opinione quatenus est sententia Doctorum dici possit quod 
est probabilis, de vera tamen opinione dici nequit sine superfluitate et ineptitudine, 
nam, cum sit assensus noster, non potest non esse probabilis; vel sine falsitate, 
si dicatur opinio improbabilis; quae qualitates sententiis tantum Doctorum, sive 
eorum opinionibus, non nostrae et verae, quae hic attenditur, competere possunt, 
nisi probabilitas sumatur abusive. Sic ille discurrit” . Mateus Homem Leitao's thesis 
is rejected by our Jesuit master in Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., 
Auctarium Indicum, Tomus III, Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n. 30, p. 8.
48 Cfr. Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, 
Tomus III, Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n, 39, p. 9: “Quae quidem regula non videtur ad­
mittenda, Nam in primis unius Doctoris sententia, licet nihil mihi in contrarium 
occurrat, certitudinem non fundat, licet excludat actualem formidinem, iuxta dicta 
n. 28 pro quo Cardinalis Lugo Disputatione 2 de Fide n. 90 inde probans cum assen­
su fidei stare posse assensum opinativum: assensus namque probabilis secundum 
suam substantiam non est formido formalis, sed radicalis, scilicet talis assensus, 
ex quo nasci posset formido, si non impediretur. Quam radicalem formidinem Illus­
trissimus Caramuel n. 83 vocat obiectivam: quam autem proprie non est serio 
discutiendum. Talis ergo est assensus, de quo loquimur, qui ex dispositione subiecti 
formidine caret, quia nihil, quod eam excitare possit, occurrit. Estque manifestum 
non posse habere certitudinem, quia non est unde eam habere queat: si enim ali­
cunde, maxime ex auctoritate Doctoris docti et pii; at inde nequit, quia ipse Doctor 
eam non habet, et nemo, quod non habet, dare potest, Quod est verum, etiamsi 
Doctor talis evidentem reputet suam sententiam; quod contingere posse tradit P. 
Arriaga, Tomo I  iri 1,2 Disputione 24 n. F .
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trary part and (ii) absence of conclusive reasons for the assented 
part equally imply a mere opinative judgment49. Truly, a system 
of justification of right conscience such as Avendano’s probabilism 
opens the door to the idea that one can be morally justified without 
acting according to what is morally true -  there can be justifiable 
moral action because of right conscience and objective practical 
falsity. This means that in moral thought a good conscience can be 
achieved without any knowledge of practical truth. There are cases 
in which someone makes bona fide and with invincible ignorance 
an assent of verisimilitude, which is justifiable and able to warrant 
good conscience concerning the subject who has to decide (as, for 
example, a judge, who is in fact supposed to be a prudent person 
or able to judge and act prudenter, does on the basis of testimonies 
of idoneous persons, who nonetheless happen to be mistaken and, 
thus, enhance objective falsity50).
49 Cfr. Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarium Indicum,
Tomus III, Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n. 32, p. 8: Contra quem in primis stat auc­
toritas Innocentii Tertii adducta nu. 28, dum enim opinionem unam aliis proba­
biliorem dicit, manifeste declarat posse dari contrarias opiniones, ut alias docet. 
Deinde arguo. Nam assensus probabilis tunc dari potest, cum mofciva, non sunt ex 
se efficacia ad convincendum intellectum, quem tamen cum formidine adversae 
partis inclinant: Atqui stare potest, ut pro contraria patet, circa quam formido est, 
motiva occurrant, quae ad illam intellectum inclinent: ergo erunt duo contrarii 
assensus, non quidem respectu eiusdem, sed diversorum, aut eiusdem pro diversis 
statibus, respectu cuius stare simul potest assensus probabilitatis, utriusque, in 
quo contrarietas nulla est; et cum assensus probabilis, opinio sit, sicut duo dantur 
assensus probabiles contrarii, ita et contrariae pariter probabiles opiniones, de 
quarum probabilitate poterit doctus legitime pronuntiare”.
50 Cfr. Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, 
Tomus III, Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n. 34, p. 8: “Neque urget quod dicitur, ex duabus 
opinionibus unam esse falsam, si contrariae sint. Si enim id aliquando obstaret, 
fieret ex eo neque assensum circa aliquid cum fundamentis sufficientibus ad incli­
nandum intellectum, licet cum formidine oppositi, posse dici probabilem. Nam forte 
falsus est, etiamsi probabilis videatur. Quod cum dici nequeat, videat sic arguens 
quomodo id stare queat, ut quod falsum est, probabile esse possit. Id quod explicari 
potest applicatione doctrinae ex Aristotele et Divo Thoma propostae n. 26. Ita enim 
falsum proponi potest, ut prudenter quis possit circa illud firmare iudicium, aut 
assentiendo eidem, aut saltem iudicando posse iuxta id, quod apparet, prudenter 
operari. Si enim multoties ita res occurrunt, ut sine ulla formidine homines verum 
iudicent, quod re ipsa falsum est, quanto illud potius accidat respectu formidolosi 
assensus vel iudicii de ipsius verisimilitudine? Sic indices duorum aut trium testi­
ficatione reum condemnant, nihil circa causam formidantes, cum tamen illi fidem 
tantum probabilem fundare queant, unde et accidere potest id esse falsum quod 
etiam cum iuramento affirmarunt, ut non pauca experimenta comprobarunt”. Cfr.
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At the theoretical level, the discussion that Avendaho will un­
dertake with his peers in Peru and in Europe can be summarized 
in the form of two problems: (1) whether the (mere) probability he 
conceives could provide practical certainty enough for right cons­
cience or to morally justified decisions; (2) whether the probability 
to be attached to a morally justified judgment is really bound to 
formido. It is at this point that an interpretation of Aristotle plays 
an important role: Avendaho wants to relate his view to Aristotle’s 
theory of right practical judgments or prudential acts. So, although 
Aristotle is not frequently mentioned in Avendaho’s Third Volume 
of the Auctarium indicum, his authority is discussed several times 
in the Fourth Volume, where in several Sessions Avendaho presents 
current debates on probabihsm in European soil and systematica­
lly defends Caramuel’s system against criticisms made by many 
different authors. By providing a revision of current literature on 
moral conscience and criticisms to Caramuel, Avendaho finds many 
critical views that focus on Aristotle’s criterion for an excellent ac­
tion, i.e. the prudent action, in which certainty enough for practical 
excellence is to be found.
4. Avendaho’s Probabilism and Aristotle’s Account 
of Prudential Acts and Practical Knowledge
As a matter of fact, in some contexts Avendaho is challenged to 
agree or disagree with a set of propositions, which were supposed
also Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarium Indicum, Tomus 
III, Pars I, Sectio I, § I, n, 35, pp. 8-9: “Neque hoc est inventum Theologorum, ut sic 
liberum sit illis secundum opinionem, quae libuerit, operari. Quod quidem non sine 
illorum iniuria dici potuit: quaerere inquam non legitimas vias ad suas et aliorum 
laxandas conscientias. Quod quidem si de uno aliquo, aut uno pluribus contingis- 
set dici, tolerabile forsitan fuisset: at pronuntiatum dictum omnes tangit, et in iis 
sapientissimos et sanctissimos, ac Theologiae Principes. Non est ergo illorum inven­
tum ob praedictum finem, sed ob manifestandam veritatem ex solidissimis deduc­
tam fundamentis et conscientiarum offendicula submovenda: cum negari nequeat 
varietatem opinionum ad id conducere non parum; quod erudite prosequitur Dom 
Caramuel in citato Apologemate, et alii. Unde et Pontifices multoties ea utuntur 
pro gravissimarum causarum decisione, ut vidimus n. 10, 28 et 33. Et iuxta eas 
responsa etiam in Iure Canonico extant, et praeter adducta egregium specimen 
occurrit in Cap. Maiores de Baptismo, ubi de infusione habituum supernaturalium 
in Baptismo parvulorum” .
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to invoke theoretical inconsistencies in any pure probabilistic sys­
tem in moral philosophy51 -  partially, at least, such inconsistencies 
would be caused by a mistaken understanding of Aristotle together 
with the exegesis of him offered by Aquinás52. So, for example, Die­
go de Avendano, endorsing Juan Caramuel’s system, sees no need 
of censorship in a proposition that enunciates: “In every probable 
opinion, there is an invincible ignorance to be found; therefore, the 
following of such opinion is licit [i.e. it is licit to act according to the 
just probable opinion, or: probable opinion gives enough support to 
right conscience]”53. But a certain author (apparently Franciscus 
Bonae Spei54) raises a criticism55 to this by affirming, on the one 
hand, that the licitude of action demands certainty or knowledge 
of what is tutum, and certainty excludes probability; on the other 
hand, a probable opinion as such offers to both contrary parts in 
dispute just persuasive reasons, and so it is actually grounded on 
doubt. A passage taken from Aristotle’s Topics (:Topicorum I 9) is 
quoted, where Aristotle would have affirmed that in the presence of 
doubt there is no room for right action. As a “merely” probable opi­
nion brings formido with itself, it cannot possibly be the fundament 
of any certain assent in an honest — that is, morally good — action56.
51 Cfr. Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus 
Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quartus, Apud Iacobum Meursium, Antuerpia 1675, 
Pars V, Sectiones I -  XXXVI, nn. 1-342, pp. 1-93.
52 So, for example, Avendaño agrees with what is proposed in Didacus de Aven- 
daño [Diego de Avendaño] S. J., Auctarii Indici Tomus Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus 
Quartus, Pars V, Sectio I, p. 2: “Circa propositionem istam: Ut actio quaepiam sit pec- 
caminosa oportet ut procedat ab homine, qui noscit et percipit, quid boni malive in ea 
sit: et antequam id videat, aut animum reflectat, actio neque bona est, neque mala”.
53 Cfr. Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus 
Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quartus, Pars Quinta, Sectio II, p. 4: “De proposi­
tione ista: Ignorantia invincibilis in oihni opinione probabili invenitur, unde licita 
est illius sequela” ,
54 Franciscus Bonae Spei [François de la Bonne Espérance sive François Cris­
pin] O.C.D. (1617-1677) was the author of Apologema retortum, seu retorta Disputa­
tio apologetica de ignorantia invincibili, Louvain -  Anvers 1665; as a matter of fact, 
he controversially wrote against Juan Caramuel, and Diego de Avendaño discusses 
Bonae Spei’s work in this part of the Auctarium Indicum, Tomus IV.
55 The four examples of debates on the interpretation .of Aristotle’s account 
of prudence that I selected, in the following paragraphs, are just a sample -  there 
are many others in Avendaño’s text. The presented sequence of examples also quite 
my own.
56 Cfr. Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus 
Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quartus, Pars V, Sectio II, n. 9, p. 4: “Habet illam
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Avendano’s answer is short and offers an interpretation of the 
authority of Aristotle that favors Caramuefs system, as well as his 
own, on the relation between “probable” and “practical certainty”. In 
probable opinion, there is doubt indeed, but to the point that it does 
not impede complete assertion. Aristotle, and his interpreter Aqui­
nas, would both say that practical judgment is made with formido, 
which includes “doubt” within it. Whoever considers an opinion to 
be licit — for reasonably conferring it some weight ~ may also act 
according to it. Otherwise it would not be a probable opinion -  that 
is, provable or supportable opinion -  but the judgment would rather 
be just “speculativum”. Moreover, from the fact that the judgment 
is, say, “just” probable, it does not follow that it is not licit. There is 
no contradiction between probability short of evidence and licitude. 
Truly, it would be a sin or an error to simply challenge an existing 
morally “certain” judgment, for by so doing the acting person would 
be exposing herself to danger. But there is no moral error when 
there is invincible ignorance or whenever it is impossible to fully 
explore the truth or falsity of sentences57.
Dom. Caramuel in Apologe mate nn. 80. Et contra illam accerrime insurgit Auctor 
pag. 26. nu. 4. et seqq, pag. 82, nu. 3. et seqq, pag. 99. nu. 30. et seqq. Sed praesertim 
pag. 86. nu, 12. Et seqq., arguens unico fundamento scilicet quia ignorantia invinci­
bilis fundat certitudinem moralem, quod ex ea operando non peccetur peccato novo 
et condistincto ab eo, in quo est voluntaria: Atqui nulla opinio probabilis praestat 
talem certitudinem: Ergo etc. Maior est certa, et Minor probatur Primo, Quia opinio 
probabilis praecise pro utraque parte habet rationes suasibiles, et ita dubitationem 
fundat ex Aristotele I. Topicor. Cap. 9, in principio', ubi de Problematibus.
57 Cfr. Didacus de Avendaho [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus 
Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quartus, Pars V, Sectio II, n. 11, p. 4: “Sic ille 
arguit, cuius fundamento, ut probationibus obarmato, uno respondeamus verbo, 
in opinione quidem probabili dubium extare, sed tale ut absolutam non impediat 
assertionem, ut est receptissima doctrina: de qua dictum Parte I. nn. 26. ex D. 
Thoma, et omnibus eum secutis sine controversia. Videndus I. p. q. 79. arti. q. ad 
4, et 2.2.q.l. arti. 4 et q. 2. arti. 1. et Lib. I. Posteriorum lectione I. qui et Aristotelis 
doctrinam amplexus. Stat ergo assensus cum formidine, quae dubium comitatur: 
et cum absolute quis censet licitam esse operationem, consequens est ut et iuxta 
tale iudicium operari queat, alias opinio probabilis non esset, et tale indicium, 
esset inutile, ac semper pure speculativum. Neque sequitur ex eo quod etiam sit 
probabile non esse licitum, cum qui dicto modo operatur, probabiliter peccatorum, 
unde peccatorum certo, quia se exponit periculo, nam ut probatum a nobis Parte 
1. et 4. ubi contra nonnullos rigidos Scriptores egimus, cum iudicio dicto concurrit 
aliud moraliter certum de licita operatione cum sententia probabili. Cum ergo in 
eo peccatum non sit, recte stat ignorantiam invincibilem suffragari, quandoquidem 
impossibile est veritatem et falsitatem sententiarum explorare, et ita prudens eli­
gitur modus iuxta illas operandi".
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In another example, the same author -  Franciscus Bonae Spei? 
-  would criticize Juan Caramuel by resorting to Aristotle, in Ethica 
Nicomachea VI, where the Greek philosopher affirmed that pruden­
ce is the “active habit with reason”. But “true” or “real” opinion is 
not grounded on “true” or “real” reason, but on “fallible” reason, as 
Aristotle would have explained in Magna Moralia I, 33 and Ethica 
Nicomachea VI, 3. So, any opinative judgment would he outside of 
the sphere of prudence. Whoever assumes opinative judgments as 
a rule for acting neither acts prudently nor has moral virtue, since 
prudence is the general rule of (morally justifiable) human acts, and 
it has a “completing character” (completiva) towards every moral 
virtue. Again, this account of right action is supposed to have su­
pport in Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea VI, 5 and massive support 
in Thomas Aquinas’s authority58. In the first part of his answer,
58 Cfr. Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus 
Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quartus, Pars V, Sectio III (Argumenta aliqua, 
quorum solutione asserta amplius lucidatur), n, 15, p. 5: “Arguit ergo apud Aucto­
rem pag. 180. nu, 180 et seqq. Primo ex Aristotele 6 Ethicor. Cap. 5. ubi prudentiam, 
ait esse habitum cum ratione activum. Atqui opinio probabilis non fundatur in ratio­
ne vera, sed fallibili, et habet idem in 1. magnor. moral. Cap. 33. et 6. Ethicor. Cap. 
3. Ergo iudicium opinativum est extra sphaeram prudentiae, et ita illud assumens 
pro regula suarum actionum, non agit prudenter, nec habet virtutem moralem, 
cum prudentia sit generalis regula humanorum actuum, et completiva omnium 
virtutum moralium, ut dicitur in 6. Ethicor. dicto Cap, 5. Et docet D. Thomas 2.2. 
q. 166. arti. 2. ad 1. et in 3. dist. 9. q. 1. arti. 1 et dist. 27. q. 2. arti, 4. quaestiun. 
2.” . In another passage, Avendano’s opponent affirms that in order to act with hon­
esty and prudently someones needs the certainty of the act honesty. But, whoever 
relies on probable opinion falls short of that moral certainty. Therefore, whoever 
acts based upon probable opinion alone does not act righteously and prudently. The 
minor premise can be proved, for any operation that equally relates to truth and 
falsity, as it is the case of an act basqd upon the “probable” alone, is “uncertain”. 
Again, the critic of Caramuel invokes Aristotle’s Magna moralia I, 13. Avendano 
answers to that by saying that he concedes the major premise, but he denies the 
minor premise. Cfr. Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S.J., Auctarii Indici 
Tomus Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quartus, Pars V, Sectio V (Discursus alii 
adversantium penitus infirmati), n. 26, p. 9: “[...], ubi etiam D. Fagnanus ea exhibet 
suae sententiae fundamenta, [...]. Primo quia ad honeste et prudenter operandum 
necessarium est ut quis habeat certitudinem de honestate operationis. [...], Sed qui 
utitur opinione probabili non habet hanc moralem certitudinem: Ergo non agit recte 
et prudenter. Minor probatur, quia operatio incerta est, cum se habeat ad verum et 
falsum, ut inquit Aristoteles saepius allegatus in I. Magnor. moral. Cap. 13, Existi­
matio est, qua in omnibus ferimur ancipites, ea ne ita, an secus. Respondeo concessa 
Maiori, negando Minorem, et ad probationem concedo opinionem incertam esse, sed 
praeter assensum circa illam dari alium de illius licita sequela, iam explicate m.
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Diego de Avendano shows agreement with the role of prudence in 
human action, but he does not agree with the view according to 
which any action lacking prudence would be simply illicit. After all, 
following the received sentence (from Aristotle?) there is no moral 
obligation of always acting according to the rules of prudence; for an 
individual can perform “indifferent acts” indeed. From the fact that 
sometimes one acts like that (i.e. following just a probable equipo­
llent judgment) it does not follow that one lacks prudence, for one 
can exert it in respect to other things as well. Moreover, our Jesuit 
master accepts the major premise of the opponent’s argument, i.e. 
“that prudence is an active habit with reason”, but he denies the 
minor premise, i.e. “that a probable opinion is not grounded on true 
reason, but on fallible reason alone”. After all, as long as one embra­
ces probable opinion, one embraces a rule of prudent men, and this 
is to follow prudence — once again confirming Diego de Avendano’s 
stance that the idea of “probable” includes at very least offering 
reasons or bringing external authorities, even though opinion is not 
a rule to be taken as “certain” in the ratio of the object itself. Such 
a cognitive procedure does not simply amount to adopt a merely 
fallible rule for action* 59.
In a third example, the opponent who criticizes Caramuel’s 
probabilistic system brings forth the thesis that (i) it is one thing 
to have enough certainty in moral issues based on several probable 
accounts, while (ii) having “probable certainty” is another issue 
altogether. After all, (i) in moral sphere having several probable
Nihil certe novi discursus praefatus exhibet, unde et potuit omitti, nec repetitione 
inutili lectorum patientiam fatigare”.
59 Cfr. Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus 
Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quartus, Pars V, Sectio III, n 15, p. 5: “Respondeo. 
Primo concedendum totum, praeter id, quod dicitur, de generali defectu prudentiae, 
quia iuxta receptam sententiam non est obligatio moralis operandi semper iuxta 
regulas prudentiae, cum possint dari actus indifferentes in individuo, et qui id ne­
gant, probabilitatem huius sententiae recognoscant. Ex eo autem quod aliquoties 
quispiam ita operetur, non sequitur esse virtute prudentiae destitutum, cum circa 
multa alia illam possit exercere, et eos ipsos actus indifferentes ex se, postea ad 
honestatis praerogativam elevare. Secundo respondeo concessa maiori negando 
Minorem, quia dum quis opinionem probabilem amplectitur, virorum prudentium 
dictamen amplectitur, quod iuxta regulas prudentiae est: minime enim ita opera­
retur, si manuductionem talem prudentiae non haberet, et licet opinio regula certa 
non sit in ratione obiecti; quod tamen illam sequi liceat, stante prudenti illo dictami­
ne, regula fallibilis non est in ordine ad operationem. Cum sit dogma firmissimum 
eum imprudenter non agere, qui prudentium consilium amplexus operatur.
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arguments and reasons or “probabilia” at disposal may suffice for 
generating certainty in the intellect and, as as consequence, produ­
cing honest action without the “fear” (formido) of the possible truth 
of the opposite part, (ii) But the same criticizer would say that pro­
bable certainty as sufficient criterion for moral action is just a false 
proposition, for there is no “probable certainty” . It is indeed a con­
tradiction to combine certitudo and probabilis. After all, certainty is 
the precise determination of the intellect into one direction or side 
of a contradiction, while (mere) probability is related indifferently 
and indeterminately to the right or the left, and hence probable 
judgment is never prudential judgment, for it does not have as its 
object the truth nor is it under the reason of the truth. It is bound 
to formido. Aristotle in Ethica Nicomachea I, 3 would endorse the 
view that certainty and probability are mutually destructive. The 
opponent ~ again, apparently Franciscus Bonae Spei -  clearly fo­
cuses on the statistical success or acceptance of practical premises,
i.e. he repeats the view that practical certainty follows what holds 
or is transmitted “in the most cases” (ut in pluribus) -  even though 
this is not strict evidential knowledge or knowledge through de­
monstration. So, ex probabilibus — here understood as “in the most 
cases”, as opposed to “equipollence” or equal probability -  one can 
reach true opinion, and as a result practical certainty. Aristotle, 
thus, would be in search of a probable reason for supporting pru­
dential judgments which excludes both the immutable character 
of scientific truths and formido. After all, practical knowledge is 
neither science nor opinion60.
m Cfr. Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus 
Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quartus, Pars V, Sectio IV (Probationes aliae propo­
sitae et enervatae, ex quibus luxamplipr receptissimae positioni), § 20, p. 7: Ait
ergo aliud esse in moralibus sufficere certitudinem ex probabilibus, et aliud sufficere 
certitudinem probabilem. Itaque tum dicimus, in moralibus sufficit certitudo, quae 
oritur et generatur in intellectu ex argumentis et rationibus probabilibus, proposi­
tio vera est, quia plures rationes probabiles sunt aptae natae generare in potentia 
rationali moralem certitudinem de honestate operationis absque ulla formidine 
partis oppositae Et haec est illa certitudo surgens ex probabilibus, quae in 
morali materia sufficit ad recte operandum. Cum vero dicimus, In moralibus sufficit 
certitudo probabilis, propositio est falsa, quia ista certitudo probabilis non datur; 
immo implicat contradictionem quod sit certitudo, et sit probabilis; quia certitudo 
est praecisa determinatio intellectus ad unum; probabilitas autem indeterminate, et 
indifferenter se habet ad rectum et obliquum, unde iudicium probabile non est pru­
dentiae, cum non habeat, pro obiecto verum, et sub ratione veri, sed est obnoxium 
formidini etc. Unde certitudo et probabilitas se mutuo destruunt ex Aristotele .1.
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In his brief reply to this objection, Avendaho confirms the Aris­
totelian view that, as far as moral matters are concerned, it suffices 
that what is true is revealed through a knowledge ut in pluribus. 
But, in fact, such Aristotelian point of view reinforces a thesis of 
probabilism, namely that in practical judgments one does not have 
any support on “total” and “infallible” certainty ~ that falsity or 
simply the contrary side of a given opinion holds true, remains a 
possibility. After all, who can deny that a certainty generated “ex 
probabilibus” suffices to a determination -  a “decision” -  about the 
cause or causes of a given effect? Still, the certainty thus generated 
does not change the fact that the matter remains in a state of proba­
bility. In fact, one testimony in the court is usually insufficient, it is 
rather necessary to have more accounts; and yet, a plural testimony 
remains only probable, for it may be false* 61.
In a fourth -  and here last example - ,  following the notion that 
several authorities with a common opinion on a practical issue,
Ethicor. Cap. 3. dum ait in morali materia satis esse ut verum ostendatur pingui 
quadam Minerva, et adumbrata figuratione, atque de iis, quae plerumque eveniunt, 
ratiocinari, et ex iis similia etiam concludere. Quibus verbis tantum intendit ut in 
materia morum non requirantur probationes per rei evidentiam, seu demonstra­
tionem, sed satis est verum ostendere per coniecturas probabiles, arguendo etiam 
a communiter accidentibus, et a similibus, quod et se fateri affirmat. Verumtamen 
oportet secundum Aristotelem, ut bis coniecturis et argumentis probabilibus osten­
datur verum, et sic non sufficit ut ostendatur probabile, quod longe distat. Quare 
qui probabilibus rationibus ostendit opinionem probabilem, non satis facit menti 
Aristotelis requirentis ut ostendatur verum, excludens scilicet formidinem, et ita 
obiectum virtutum intellectualium, quod est immutabile, unde et prudentiam ab 
opinione distinxit” .
61 Cfr. Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S. J., Auctarii Indici To­
mus Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quartus, Pars V, Sectio IV, n, 23, p. 8 : “Et in 
primis quod ad Aristotelem attinet, pro opposita non obscure sententia facit, cum 
dicat in moralibus satis esse ut verum, pingui Minerva, adumbrata figuratione, ex 
frequenter evenientibus, et similibus, ostendatur. Haec enim manifeste indicant 
non esse necessariam omnimodam et infallibilem certitudinem, qualis ab Auctore 
exigitur: sicut et verum immutabile; hoc enim non pingui Minerva verum est, ut 
liquet. Quod neque in sic arguentis sententia stare potest, cum accidere queat esse 
falsum id, quod ut certum quis, dum operatur, amplectitur. Deinde D. Antonini 
doctrina cum Aristotelicae consonet, sinistre ad contrarium sensum inflectitur, 
lam quod certitudo ex probabilibus genita ad caussarum decisionem sufficiat quis 
negat? Illud tamen negari merito debet, certitudinem scilicet talem extrahere rem 
iudicio subiectam ab statu probabilitatis. Unus quidem testis non satis ad iudicium 
probabile de veritate, si non sit sublimi aliqua praerogativa qualificatus, [...]. Sed 
in ordine adiudiciale forum duo sunt satis [...]. Atqui id quod illi affirmant, tantum 
est probabile, quia falsum esse potest,
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similarly to several and similar cases of prior and posterior states 
of affairs or causes and effects in nature, work as a criterion of cer­
tain knowledge ut in pluribus, thinkers such as Franciscus Bonae 
Spei and Prospero Fagnani raise the criticism against Caramuel, 
holding that an opinion, in order to become probable as far as the 
matter it deals with is concerned, needs more than the authority 
of one Doctor, no matter how wise, probe and pious he is. After all, 
never has there been an idea so absurd and vain that it found no 
pious and probe Doctor in favor of it. Prospero Fagnani mentions 
Aristotle in Topicorum I, 1, where it is affirmed that it is probable 
whatever seems to be grounded on the views of all wise men and the 
most renowned men (in the plural)62. But, as an answer to the first 
point, Avendano denies that whoever follows the sentence of one 
Doctor alone is then lead into it only through authority; he usually 
is or can be led into it also through reason, for the Doctor can only 
persuade to the point of producing a subjective probability, with an 
objective basis, if he has a good grounding for the thing in question. 
Now, regarding the passage by Aristotle, Avendano affirms that 
Aristotle is not an opponent, but rather a promoter of the idea that 
the view by one wise man is or can be probable. After all the mea­
ning of the passage is not that it is necessary that many wise men 
agree regarding one sentence, but that to every truly wise man a 
probable view must be a prerogative, and so it will be for future wise 
persons, too. A probable view, therefore, can be taken as a universal 
proposition, whose “truth” will be, in the future, in such singular 
instances of wise persons, truly confirmed. Neither it is the case 
that probity and wisdom of one person grows from the excellence
62 Cfr. Didacus de Avendano [Di^go de Avendano] S.J., Auctarii Indici Tomus 
Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quartus, Pars V, Sectio VIII (De unius Doctoris 
auctoritate pro concilianda sententiae alicui probabilitate), n. 59, p. 17: “ [.,.]. Circa 
quod Auctor [...] statuit Primo ad opinionem probabilem, in materia, de qua agimus, 
non sufficere praecise auctoritatem unius Doctoris, etiam docti, pii, et probi. Et 
probat in primis, quia alioqui, cum nihil sit ita fatuum, absurdum, et sceleratum, 
quod non habeat auctorem et patronum alias pium, doctum, et probum, nihil erit 
ita fatuum, absurdum, et exorbitans, quod non liceat sequi. Deinde, auctoritas 
praecisa ratione est fatua et absurda. Atqui neque illud, neque istum sequi licet, 
ut per se est manifestum. Ergo. Confirmat Fagnani exaggerationibus, de quibus 
nuper, ex eo D. Caramuelem perstringens, adductis pro se, quos iam dedimus n. 
52. Item ex eodem addicente Aristotelis auctoritatem ex 1 Topicor. Cap. 1. Ubi ait 
possibilia esse, quae videntur omnibus, aut sapientibus, et his maxime notis, quod 
Alexandri et Boethii expositione corroborat.
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of many; nor it is so that the excellence of many is needed to give 
one wise man faith. Avendaho adds, still, that the words of Aristotle 
are not repeated properly. After all, after “omnibus” in the text we 
would have “aut sapientibus”. Aristotle contrasts “of all” and “of the 
wise” . Thus, it follows that the probability of a given opinion can be 
perceived, even if the wise are not many63.
This exercise in discussing critical views and interpretations of 
passages in Topica, Ethica Nicomachea and Magna Moralia was im­
portant so Avendaho could find in the authority of Aristotle a kind 
of support for his probabilistic system in practical philosophy, both 
concerning (A) the nature of probable opinion as a kind of mental 
act and (B) the sufficiency of probable opinion to bestow conscience 
and moral action with some degree of practical certainty which is 
short of evidence, but is enough to overcome doubt -  thus, enough 
to rectitude. Avendaho does not affirm that Aristotle's position on 
prudential acts is the same as the probabilistic view about moral 
action. Rather, what he attempts to do is to show that probabilism 
as a moral system is coherent with Aristotle’s account of prudential 
acts: they share a common point in probability and reason. Gran­
ted that a prudential act for Aristotle is both reasonable and not 
strictly evident, the probabilist thinker would happily insist that is 
has, for objective reasons, the presence of reason (provability) and 
formido -  just like the probable opinion. Moreover, we believe that, 
for Diego de Avendaho, the following four theses about probabilism
63 Cfr. Didacus de Avendano [Diego de Avendano] S A ..Auctarii Indici Tomus 
Secundus, seu Thesauri Tomus Quarius, Pars Quinta, Sectio VIII, nn. 62-63, p. 
18: “ [62] Omnia autem praedicta facili responsione convelli. Ad Primum enim dici 
potest considerata Doctoris qualitate neutiquam praesumendum esse, stultam, 
absurdam, et sceleratam illius esse sententiam; quod quidem sine ipsius nequit 
iniuria proferri, vel etiam cogitari. Et licet verum haberi possit id, quod additur 
de auctoritate praecisa, negandum tamen est suppositum, quod scilicet cum quia 
sententiam unius Doctoris amplectitur, sola auctoritate ducatur, sed etiam ratione, 
dum sibi persuadet Doctorem tantum non posse non pro illa solidum habere funda­
mentum. [63] Ad Secundum. Aristotelem non esse contrarium, sed fautorem, dum 
ait, Aut sapientibus. Neque enim est. sensus ut necessarium sit plures sapientes 
in unam sententiam convenire, sed quod cuicumque vere tali ea sit praerogativa, 
supponendo plures futuros sapientes: est enim propositio universalis, cuius veri­
tas in singulis vere talibus comprobatur. Neque unius sapientia, probitas, et aliae 
qualitates-ex aliorum excellentia crescunt, unde neque illa necessaria est, ut eidem 
fides adhibeatur. Addo Aristotelis verba non integre adduci: post illud enim Omni­
bus habet, Aut pluribus: his autem contraponit sapientes: Ergo ex his probabilitas 
desumi potest, etiam si non plures illi, ut expendi Parte 1. num. 634".
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have support in Aristotelian authorities, following the sequence of 
the above mentioned four examples: (1) Licit moral acts are or can 
be in its constitution “probable” and “with doubt”; (2) prudential 
acts do not eliminate “opinative judgments” or an only fallible cer­
tainty, short of evidence and within the scope of “formido” or “fear” 
/ “suspicion” ; (3) there is some “certainty” or objective judicative 
force enough for “good conscience” in mere “probable opinion”, and 
even certainty ut in pluribus is fallible and just probable, after all; 
(4) probability can be found just in “provability” by intrinsic and 
extrinsic reasons, even when it is not only or mainly supported “in 
most of the cases” or by most authorities.
Concluding Remarks: Probabilism and Law 
in a Multicultural Society
As we have said in earlier sections, Avendaho does not explicitly 
discuss doctrines of Aristotle’s Política ~~ his Política is Solórzano 
y Pereira’s Política indiarum. But his probabilistic view in moral 
philosophy has played a direct and obvious role in his richly diverse 
exercises of juridical interpretation and determination of practical 
judgments reported in the volumes of the Auctarium indicum. 
Avendaho did not offer a theoretical treatment of law -  in a “De 
legibus treatise” of sorts - ,  but rather provided accounts of preferable 
positive legislation in Peruvian 17th century multicultural society. 
At this point, it must be clear that the Jesuit master combines 
an account of probable opinion regarding right conscience with 
the view that the Aristotelian virtue of prudence is coherent with 
(just) probable opinion in matters of (moral) acts, and a similar 
doctrinal affinity should be séen also regarding the interpretation 
of principles of law and determinations of positive laws in human 
affairs.
Historians agree that the 17tli century was a period of stabiliza­
tion in Peruvian viceroyal society, where the main challenge was to 
create adequate means for long term coexistence in a quite multi­
cultural society. The presence of Spanish settlers and institutional 
apparatus provoked, of course, a huge impact in social, political, 
economical, spatial, and religious forms of life. It was absolutely 
central to develop moral and juridical procedures that would allow 
mutual understanding in a heterogenous society -  and it was wi­
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thin a probabilistic framework in practical philosophy that such 
an understanding was pursued64. The room for doubt in moral and 
juridical sphere as the place of offering a just probable view because 
of the absence of certainty concerning different contrary opinative 
judgments or prescriptions seems to be a valid framework to un­
derstand Avendaño’s exercises of legislation and juridical interpre­
tation, especially where the “Indios” are concerned65. In bringing 
moral judgments and legal determinations to the realm of opinions, 
different subjectivities — either individual or collective -  begin to 
play a prominent role in moral and legal thought. If we keep in 
mind our previous definition of probabilism, we see also in law the 
importance of a rule containing “intrinsic properties” (immanent 
reasons in the object or moral content as such) and “extrinsic pro­
perties” (defensible external authorities and successful cases in 
favor of it). Avendaño will use this structure of law as a possibility 
for collectivities such as indigenous groups and societies to express 
towards the prescribed form of law a so-called “reflex judgment”, i.e. 
a subjective or intersubjective approximation of their conscience to 
a given norm, unveiling a space for discussing a probable opinion 
in their favor66 or in favor of their well established traditions and 
moral sensitivities -  something that must be considered before any 
official or definite promulgation of a law.
So, for example, in the First Volume of his Thesaurus indicus, 
Diego de Avendaño widely practices such a probabilistic reasoning 
in legal interpretation -  in the most interesting cases, he is expli­
citly playing the role of someone who morally-legally advises the 
Spanish Catholics Kings, who are responsible for protecting the 
Indios -  servi liberi of the empire — from legal offenses (iniuria) 
and have the duty of finding for the relevant cases the right cons­
cience or moral decision: (1) in the case of producing and selling of 
the coca leaf, one must directly follow the prescription that ‘The 
production of something must be prohibited when it is destined to 
a bad usage” , but, while regarding the minor premise that “The 
production of coca leaf is destined to a bad usage (i.e. some tradi­
tional offerings to Andean or Incan divine entities)”, one must also 
consider the reflex judgment “The production of coca leaf is a tradi-
64 Cfr. also P. Macera, “Probabilismo en el Perú durante el siglo XVIII”, La 
Nueva Crónica (Lima) (1963) 8-31.
65 Cfr. Victor Hugo Martel Paredes, op. cit., pp. 53-55.
66 Ibid,, p, 56. Cfr. also the literature mentioned in footnotes 2, 3 and 33.
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tional activity for the sake of a traditional medicinal usage, and its 
prohibition would generate hostilities”67. Such a “reflex judgment” 
as a presumption of costume, under the framework of a probable 
opinion, occurs immediately or can immediately be presumed in 
cases of invincible ignorance and “good faith”, i.e. in cases in which 
there is no knowledge of an existing law, and proceeding in such a 
manner does not constitute illicit act. Such a social background for 
legislation, combined with a probabilistic system, would theoretica­
lly allow for normativity in Latin America to concede a larger room 
for cultural phenomena, where opinions are then transformed into 
positive laws -  or at least help forming just sentences -  according 
to the conveniences and inconveniences of situations68.
Truly, the same structure of direct sentences of law and reflex 
probable judgments can be seen in other legal situations described 
by Avendaño in the First Volume of the Thesaurus indicus: (2) “It is 
a benefit to the empire that everyone of its subjects works and pays 
tributes to the crown”, but together with the practical judgment 
that “The Indios should work and pay tributes to the crown” one 
must consider the reflex judgment that “The Indios are probably 
unfit to some kinds of work such as mining work and should not be 
forced, but rather excused of it”, since their population has severely 
decreased and because in mining work they are put outside of their 
natural milieu69. (3) “It is correct that political subjects have a duty 
to work and pay taxes to those who are their protectors and for the 
good of public institutions which are supposed to provide public 
utilities”, but together with the practical judgments that “The In­
dios should be [conveniently] forced to work”, including here “forced 
to work in the mines”, one must consider the reflex judgment that 
“The Indios should be [conveniently] forced to work, but in case they
67 The premises in quotation marks are paraphrases of my own, which should 
be loyal to the contents in Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Thesau­
rus indicus, seu gene ralis instructor pro regimine conscientiae, in Us quae ad INDI­
AS spectant. Tomus Primus, Apud Iacobum Meursium, Antuerpia 1668, Titulus I, 
Cap. XIV, § IV (Assertio séptima circa eoeam, et notanda quaedam circa illam), nn. 
138-148, pp. 31-33. Cfr. Victor Hugo Martel Paredes, op. cit., p. 190.
68 Cfr. Victor Hugo Martel Paredes, op. cit., pp. 60-62.
69 The premises in quotation marks are paraphrases of my own, which should 
be loyal to the contents in Didacus de Avendaño [Diego de Avendaño] S.J., Thesau­
rus indicus, Tomus Primus, Titulus I, Cap. XII (Minerisne effodiendis possint Indi, 
talem non meriti poenam, sine labe culpae lethalis addict), nn. 109-118, pp. 24-27. 
Cfr. also Victor Hugo Martel Paredes, op. cit., pp. 185-188.
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work in the mines they should not be obliged to pay taxes”, after all 
that kind of work is brutally hard and severely abbreviates their 
life expectation70. Many other interesting examples could be given 
about several other classes of labours and the relationship between 
their incomes and the duty of paying taxes71, as well as about the 
work of the Indios in textile workshops, specifically the taxation 
on communities, persons, and women72, etc. As we have seen, the 
“reflex judgment” necessary to fix the promulgation of any law -  
especially of those that appear doubtful or insufficiently promulga­
ted and, therefore, should rather be taken as “projects of law” - ,  in 
Diego de Avendano’s legal hermeneutics, is the moment of probable 
opinion and freedom: it considers as intrinsic properties the will of 
the indigenous people, the “provability” of such reactive judgment 
based on costume, good faith and reason. This highlights a legitima­
te resistance towards the new state of affairs or new legal system 
in face of the practical impossibility of its observance. Under the 
framework of probable opinion to moral and legal determination, 
there is a possibility of reaching collective subjective resolutions, by 
means of convenience, and again this is not an objective epistemic 
protection of error, but a “certainty’ and “security” strong enough 
to conduct persons to prudential action or to prudential laws.
A  more thorough research on Avendano’s specific views on fur­
ther Aristotelian themes in law and politics remains yet to be done, 
including debates on the nature of law, the relationship between 
law and justice and the hypothesis that his exercises of legal inter­
pretation and positive legislation has some connection, given the 
fragility of the certainty provided by laws, to an account of equity 
as a means to approximate the generality of rules and the justice 
due to particular and concrete human affairs. As far as Avendano’s
70 The premises in quotation marks are paraphrases of my own, which should 
be loyal to the contents in Didacus de Avendaho [Diego de Avendaho] S .J ., Thesau­
rus indieus, Tomus Primus, Titulus I, Cap. XII, nn. 109-118, pp. 24-27; Cap. XVII 
(Reges Catholici ut possint tributa Indis imponere), nn. 170-180, pp. 37-39. Cfr. also 
Victor Hugo Martel Paredes, op. cit., pp. 191-196.
71 Cfr. Didacus de Avendaho [Diego de Avendaho] S, J., Thesaurus indieus, 
Tomus Primus, Titulus I, Cap. XVII, nn. 170-180, pp. 37-39. Cfr. also Victor Hugo 
Martel Paredes, op. cit., pp. 191-203.
72 Cfr. Didacus de Avendaho [Diego de Avendaho] S.J., Thesaurus indieus, 
Tomus Primus, Titulus I, Cap. XIV, §§ I-III, V, nn. 125-137, 149-152, pp. 28-31, 
33-34. Cfr. also Victor Hugo Martel Paredes, op. cit,, pp. 88-189, 191-203.
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-  quite heterodox! ~~ understanding of prudence is concerned, we are 
once again faced with an attempt to show that just as probabilistic 
views on moral conscience should be coherent with Aristotle’s pru­
dential account of human acts, so a probabilistic interpretation of 
laws should be coherence with Aristotle’s views on them, too73, and, 
above all, with Aristotle’s view on the “positive laws”, that is, the 
“laws of the city”. After all, these exist, as just means to promoting 
virtues and, thus, the good of society74, only through the political 
art. i.e, through wise legislation and promulgation by a political 
authority75. And laws are essentially common or general76, cove­
ring entire “classes of actions” and, thus, only the majority of cases, 
which means that individual actions are judged according to laws 
that have general prescriptive content77. Further research on Die­
go de Avendano’s account of law and equity might reveal, it seems 
to us, important appropriations of Aristotelian discourses to what 
would certainly be a non-Aristotelian purpose: an interpretation of 
laws and a legislation practice that tends not to jurisprudence, but 
rather to casuistry.
Resumen
El artículo muestra la existencia de vínculos, en el pensamiento de 
Diego de Avendaño S.J. (1594-1688), entre el probabilismo y el tratamiento 
aristotélico del conocimiento práctico y de la prudencia. El pensamiento 
probabilista de Avendaño puede ser descripto solo mediante el análisis 
de largos pasajes tomados de los seis monumentales volúmenes de su 
Auctarium indicum (Amberes, 1668-1686). Aunque en sentido estricto las 
ideas políticas de Avendaño no son las de un pensador aristotélico, inten­
ta apoyarse en Aristóteles para fostener su tesis según la cual la certeza 
práctica suficiente para la recta consciencia moral puede ser la certeza
73 Cfr., for example, Aristotle, Política III 16, 1287al8; VII 14, 1326a29-. Cfr. 
also W. Von Leyden, “Aristotle on the Concept of Law”, Philosophy, 42 (1967) 1-19; 
D. N. Schroeder, “Aristotle on Law”, Polis, 4 (1981) 17-31; R, Kraut, Aristotle. 
Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, pp. 105-132, 451-457.
74 Aristotle, Política III 9, 1280612; Eihica Nicomachea V 3, 1129619-24; V 
5, 1130624-.
75 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea V 3, 1129619-24; V 5, 1130624-; Ehetorica I 
1, 1354a31-35.
76 Aristotle, Política II 8, 1269all; III, 11, 128264-6; III 15, 1286al0-.
77 Aristotle, Política III 11, 128264-6; III 16,1287622-; Ethica Nicomachea V 
14, 1137614-25; V 14, 1137626-29.
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meramente probable -en ñn de cuentas, la certeza probable es todo lo que 
la prudencia puede ofrecer al agente moral (y político)-. Avendaño consi­
dera que su probabilismo es coherente con un tratamiento prudencial del 
conocimiento práctico, y eso, además, es algo que Avendaño relaciona con 
la esfera de la ley. Uno de los resultados de esa conexión entre una doctri­
na probabilista-prudencial de la rectitud moral y la exigencia de justicia 
legal fue la creación, no de una tradición de jurisprudencia en sentencias 
jurídicas, sino de una hermenéutica legal orientada por la comunidad y 
por los casos individuales: en otras palabras, la muy criticada casuística 
legal de los jesuítas.
